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ABSTRACT—Advance health care directives are tools that allow people to 
state their health care treatment wishes or designate a health care proxy in 
anticipation of being unable to make those decisions in the future, including 
preferences to remove life-sustaining medical treatment. However, thirty-six 
states currently have “pregnancy exclusion” laws that require physicians to 
void the advance directives of pregnant women receiving life-sustaining 
treatment. This Note assesses the constitutionality and ethics of state 
pregnancy exclusion statutes by employing a new five-category typology of 
current pregnancy exclusion laws. This Note argues that all categories of 
these statutes violate an individual’s constitutional rights to terminate a 
pregnancy and to refuse lifesaving medical treatment, and also contends that 
pregnancy exclusion laws as they currently exist violate basic bioethical 
principles by restricting the autonomy of patients. To conclude, this Note 
provides a potential reform to pregnancy exclusion laws that passes 
constitutional muster and meets today’s ethical standards. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In 2013, a Texas woman named Marlise Muñoz suffered a sudden blood 
clot in her lungs and was rushed to the hospital from her home.1 Marlise was 
fourteen weeks pregnant at the time and was later determined to be brain-
dead.2 Her family instructed the hospital to remove her from life support 
since she had previously expressed that she did not want to be kept on life 
support under any circumstances.3 However, because the hospital discovered 
the pregnancy, it refused to comply and continued to keep Marlise’s body 
connected to life support machines. 4 The physicians decided to override 
Marlise’s instructions and continue treating her, despite the fact that the fetus 
was not yet viable and would likely have been born with birth defects if 
 
 1  Manny Fernandez & Erik Eckholm, Pregnant, and Forced to Stay on Life Support, N.Y.  
TIMES (Jan. 7, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/08/us/pregnant-and-forced-to-stay-on-life-
support.html [https://perma.cc/3YM9-JJJ7]; Wade Goodwyn, The Strange Case of Marlise Munoz and 
John Peter Smith Hospital, NPR (Jan. 28, 2014, 5:44 PM), https://www.npr.org/sections/health-
shots/2014/01/28/267759687/the-strange-case-of-marlise-munoz-and-john-peter-smith-hospital 
[https://perma.cc/PU2H-9LHC]. 
 2 Goodwyn, supra note 1. 
 3 Id. 
 4 Fernandez & Eckholm, supra note 1. 
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brought to term.5 Marlise’s body remained on life support for two months 
until a court ordered the hospital to respect her wishes.6 
In justifying its decision, the hospital cited a Texas state statute that 
voids the advance health care directives of pregnant patients and directs 
physicians to maintain life-sustaining measures until the fetus is brought to 
term,7 even if a woman has clearly communicated that she does not wish to 
be placed on life support upon entering a persistent vegetative state. 8 
Advance health care directives are legal instruments by which a competent 
person either instructs physicians to withhold medical treatment in certain 
conditions where the person will be unable to make medical decisions (i.e., 
a living will) or designates a health care agent to make health care decisions 
for her if she becomes unable to do so (i.e., a durable power of attorney for 
health care).9 Although Marlise did not have advance directives, the Texas 
“pregnancy exclusion” law allowed the physicians to lawfully ignore the 
instructions of Marlise’s husband acting as her health care agent.10 A state 
trial judge ultimately ruled that the hospital had to remove Marlise from life 
support because she was brain-dead—which is a legal form of death under 
Texas law 11 —and thus the life support treatment was not a “[l]ife-
[s]ustaining [m]easure.”12 However, the judge made no determination about   
 
 5 Id.; Manny Fernandez, Judge Orders Hospital to Remove Pregnant Woman from Life Support, N.Y. 
TIMES (Jan. 24, 2014) [hereinafter Fernandez, Judge Orders], https://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/ 
25/us/judge-orders-hospital-to-remove-life-support-from-pregnant-woman.html [https://perma.cc/U75F-
HMRX] (“Lawyers for Ms. Muñoz’s husband, Erick Muñoz, said they were provided with medical 
records that showed the fetus was ‘distinctly abnormal’ and suffered from hydrocephalus—an 
accumulation of fluid in the cavities of the brain—as well as a possible heart problem.”). 
 6 Id.; Judgment, Muñoz v. John Peter Smith Hospital, No. 096-270080-14, 9th Jud. District Tex.  
(Jan. 24, 2014), http://thaddeuspope.com/images/MUNOZ_202053415-Judges-Order-on-Munoz-
Matter.pdf [https://perma.cc/6B3Y-LDAP]. 
 7 See Fernandez & Eckholm, supra note 1; 2 TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 166.049 (West 
2019) (“A person may not withdraw or withhold life-sustaining treatment under this subchapter from a 
pregnant patient.”). 
 8 See 2 TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 166.033 (West 2019). The arguments in this Note 
would apply equally to any pregnant person, regardless of gender identity. See Saru M. Matambanadzo, 
Reconstructing Pregnancy, 69 SMU L. REV. 187, 197 n.56 (2016) (discussing pregnant men). However, 
this Note will continue to refer to pregnant women because it is still overwhelmingly women who are 
pregnant and because discussions and laws concerning reproductive rights have long assumed that only 
women can become pregnant. See id. at 195–98. 
 9  Advance Directives: Definitions, PATIENTS RTS. COUNCIL (2013), http://www.patientsrights 
council.org/site/advance-directives-definitions/ [https://perma.cc/SUL4-FMB8]. 
 10  See Susan Donaldson James, Husband Wants Pregnant Wife off Life Support, ABC NEWS  
(Dec. 23, 2013, 12:00 AM), https://abcnews.go.com/Health/husband-pregnant-wife-off-life-
support/story?id=21291086 [https://perma.cc/QHZ5-JGTU]. 
 11 8 TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 671.001(b) (West 2019). 
 12 Judgment, supra note 6. 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
972 
whether this Texas law was constitutional as applied to pregnant patients in 
a persistent vegetative state who have previously communicated their end-
of-life wishes to remove life support in this condition.13 
This story sparked national conversation about the constitutional and 
bioethical issues underlying state pregnancy exclusion laws that void the 
advance health care directives of pregnant women being sustained through 
life-support technology.14 In addition to Texas, thirty-five other states have 
similar statutes that either prohibit or greatly restrict physicians from 
honoring a pregnant patient’s advance health care directives to refuse life-
sustaining treatment.15 The ethical issues these laws pose are made even 
more complex today, given advances in new technology that can ventilate 
and sustain the bodily functions of patients in a persistent vegetative state for 
extended periods of time. 16  Technology and advanced mechanical 
 
 13 See id.; Fernandez, Judge Orders, supra note 5. A persistent vegetative state occurs when the 
patient is only being kept alive by medical intervention due to a state of complete unresponsiveness for 
more than a month to psychological and physical stimuli, with no sign of higher brain function. See Joseph 
J. Fins, Brain Injury: Neuroscience and Neuroethics, HASTINGS CTR., https://thehastingscenter. 
org/briefingbook/the-vegetative-and-minimally-conscious-states/ [https://perma.cc/87C2-ANHN]. In 
most cases, people in a persistent vegetative state do not recover; however, in rare cases people may 
slowly improve over a period of months to years. Kenneth Maiese, Vegetative State, MERCK MANUAL: 
CONSUMER VERSION, https://www.merckmanuals.com/home/brain,-spinal-cord,-and-nerve-disorders/ 
coma-and-impaired-consciousness/vegetative-state [https://perma.cc/4DZK-4VUH]. 
 14 See, e.g., Goodwyn, supra note 1; Malcolm Parker, Brain Death, Pregnancy and Ethics: The Case 
of Marlise Munoz, CONVERSATION (Jan. 20, 2014, 10:31 PM), https://theconversation.com/brain-death-
pregnancy-and-ethics-the-case-of-marlise-munoz-22076 [https://perma.cc/6QJT-KRQH]; Katherine 
Taylor & Lynn Paltrow, Marlise Munoz Case Shines Light on Dehumanizing ‘Pregnancy Exclusion’ 
Laws, REWIRE.NEWS (Jan. 9, 2014, 2:35 PM), https://rewire.news/article/ 
2014/01/09/marlise-munoz-case-shines-light-on-dehumanizing [https://perma.cc/GF2F-497S]. 
 15 See infra note 56. Many litigants have attempted to challenge state pregnancy exclusion laws as 
unconstitutional in state courts, but these attempts have been largely unsuccessful due to issues with injury 
and standing—the women whose rights are injured as a result of these laws are unable to bring a challenge 
in their incapacitated state. Cf. DiNino v. State ex rel. Gorton, 684 P.2d 1297, 1300–01 (Wash. 1984) 
(declining to find Washington’s pregnancy exclusion law unconstitutional and holding patient’s action 
largely unsuccessful because she was neither pregnant nor terminally ill). But see Univ. Health Servs. 
Inc. v. Piazzi, No. CV86-RCCV-464 (Ga. Super. Ct. Aug. 4, 1986) (upholding Georgia’s pregnancy 
exclusion law by relying on public policy and clarifying that a woman’s right to abort a nonviable fetus 
is based on the right to privacy which is extinguished upon brain death). In May 2018, four plaintiffs filed 
a lawsuit in federal court in Idaho challenging the state’s pregnancy exclusion law, bringing the 
underlying constitutional and bioethical issues back into the spotlight. See Complaint, Almerico v. Idaho, 
No.1:18-cv-00239-EJL (D. Idaho May 31, 2018), http://docs.legalvoice.org/ 
Almerico_v_Idaho_Complaint.pdf [https://perma.cc/CDW2-SEDQ]. The district court dismissed the 
plaintiffs’ facial constitutional challenge to Idaho’s pregnancy exclusion law on March 28, 2019, but with 
leave to amend to assert an as-applied challenge. See Memorandum Decision and Order, Almerico v. 
Idaho, No. 1:18-cv-00239-BLW (D. Idaho Mar. 28, 2019), https://cases.justia.com/federal/district-
courts/idaho/iddce/1:2018cv00239/41475/33/0.pdf [https://perma.cc/98P4-J4ME]. 
 16 See Majid Esmaeilzadeh et al., One Life Ends, Another Begins: Management of a Brain-Dead 
Pregnant Mother—A Systemic Review, 8 BMC MED. 74, 79–80 (2010), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/ 
pmc/articles/PMC3002294/pdf/1741-7015-8-74.pdf [https://perma.cc/3YTV-7PGX] (explaining 
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ventilators now allow for gestation in a woman’s body, even if a woman is 
brain-dead.17 According to a 2010 study, there are only thirty reported cases 
where such posthumous gestation has occurred using life-support technology 
thus far, with twelve viable fetuses successfully brought to term and only one 
of those fetuses experiencing deformities at birth.18 Since this 2010 study, 
there have only been a few additional cases in the international media where 
pregnant women who are either brain-dead or in a persistent vegetative state 
have successfully brought a fetus to term using advanced neonatal 
technology.19 
Despite the arguable success of such technology, there is a clear tension 
between state pregnancy exclusion laws and bioethical principles that 
suggest physicians should respect advance health care directives, or at least 
allow health care agents or family members to make final decisions based on 
their understanding of the patient’s values.20 For instance, the Committee on 
Ethics of the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists has 
stated that “[p]hysicians are encouraged to support a pregnant woman’s 
autonomy and decisions whenever legally possible,” and “[t]he health care 
facility should not attempt to contravene her wishes and values, whether she 
voices them or they are relayed by a surrogate decision maker.”21 When a 
physician ignores the advance directives of a pregnant patient, not only does 
such a decision prevent a woman from dying a natural death, but the forced 
application of technology to sustain the fetus could also cause the woman’s 
body to subsequently deteriorate—adding additional anguish to surviving 
family and friends. 22  Pregnancy exclusion laws would thus likely force 
 
potential technological ways to sustain fetal life in pregnant women who are brain-dead, including 
mechanical respiratory ventilation, cardiovascular support and monitoring, endocrine support, 
thermoregulation, warming blankets, and nutritional support). 
 17 Id. at 74. 
 18 Id. at 75–76, 79. 
 19 See, e.g., Czech Doctors Deliver Baby Girl 117 Days After Mother’s Brain-Death, REUTERS (Sept. 
2, 2019, 9:22 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-czech-birth/czech-doctors-deliver-baby-girl-117-
days-after-mothers-brain-death-idUSKCN1VN1HQ [https://perma.cc/QL92-2SFG]; Portugal Baby 
Born to Woman Brain Dead for Three Months, BBC NEWS (Mar. 29, 2019), https://www.bbc.com/ 
news/world-europe-47741343 [https://perma.cc/LB8K-KR94]; see also Amelia McDonell-Parry, 
Woman in 14-Year Coma Gives Birth in Arizona, ROLLING STONE (Jan. 23, 2019, 4:54 PM), 
https://www.rollingstone.com/culture/culture-news/coma-birth-woman-arisona-hacienda-healthcare-
776902 [https://perma.cc/6CDC-CWV9]. 
 20 See infra Part III. 
 21 COMM. ON ETHICS, AM. C. OF OBSTETRICIANS & GYNECOLOGISTS, COMM. OP. NO. 617, END-OF-
LIFE DECISION-MAKING (2015), https://www.acog.org/Clinical-Guidance-and-Publications/Co 
mmittee-Opinions/Committee-on-Ethics/End-of-Life-Decision-Making [https://perma.cc/6QAM-57A3] 
(committee opinion reaffirmed in 2018). 
 22 The case of Marlise Muñoz is representative of the connection between diminished brain function 
and subsequent bodily deterioration. Marlise’s husband, Erick, argued that “sustaining her body 
artificially amounted to ‘the cruel and obscene mutilation of a deceased body,’” and in an affidavit to the 
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physicians to sustain a pregnant woman in a persistent vegetative state on 
life-support technology until “she dies, the fetus dies, or she gives birth.”23 
While such cases of physicians keeping a pregnant woman on life support in 
contravention of her advance health care directives are rare,24 those cases 
that have occurred nevertheless raise serious concerns about whether 
pregnancy exclusion statutes violate these women’s constitutional rights to 
refuse lifesaving care and to terminate a nonviable pregnancy. 
This Note proceeds as follows: Part I provides general background on 
advance health care directives and pregnancy exclusion laws, followed by a 
survey of current state pregnancy exclusion statutes that categorizes the laws 
into five different types based on restrictiveness. Building on existing 
scholarship, this Note employs a new five-category typology to account for 
important variations in statutory language and analyzes the constitutional 
impact of pregnancy exclusion laws as they apply to all advance directives—
both living wills and the use of health care proxies. Part II then argues that 
all existing pregnancy exclusion laws are unconstitutional because laws that 
force physicians to void a pregnant patient’s advance directives violate a 
woman’s right to terminate a pregnancy under the Planned Parenthood v. 
Casey “undue burden” standard. 25  Part II further argues that all state 
pregnancy exclusion laws also violate an individual’s right to refuse 
lifesaving medical treatment under Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department 
 
court he “said little to him was recognizable about his wife. Her bones crack when her stiff limbs move. 
Her usual scent has been replaced by the ‘smell of death.’ And her once lively eyes have become 
‘soulless.’” Caleb Hellerman et al., Brain-Dead Texas Woman Taken Off Ventilator, CNN  
(Jan. 27, 2014, 7:26 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2014/01/26/health/texas-pregnant-brain-dead-woman 
[https://perma.cc/P6LL-692Q]. Similar deterioration, such as wasting muscles, skin breakdown, and the 
formation of ulcers can occur in pregnant women in a persistent vegetative state due to the continuation 
of life-support technology. See Cheryl Arenella, Coma and Persistent Vegetative State: An Exploration 
of Terms, AM. HOSPICE FOUND., https://americanhospice.org/caregiving/coma-and-persistent-vegetative-
state-an-exploration-of-terms [https://perma.cc/G8BY-M6DT]. 
 23 Elizabeth Villarreal, Pregnancy and Living Wills: A Behavioral Economic Analysis, 128 YALE L.J. 
F. 1052 (Apr. 8, 2019). 
 24 A medical case study reports that a MEDLINE search of the terms “pregnancy” and “persistent 
vegetative state” showed only twenty cases of pregnant patients in a persistent vegetative state from 
December 1977 through January 2016. Matthew P. Romagano et al., Treatment of a Pregnant Patient in 
a Persistent Vegetative State, 129 OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 107, 108 (2017). It is unclear how many 
of those cases involved physicians voiding the advance directives of pregnant patients in a persistent 
vegetative state. 
 25 See 505 U.S. 833, 877–79 (1992) (holding the state’s interest in protecting the potential life of a 
fetus does not override the right of a woman to have an abortion until after viability, and before viability 
the state may only regulate that right to the extent the regulation does not pose an “undue burden” to 
exercising it). 
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of Health,26 especially in cases where a woman has clearly communicated 
her end-of-life wishes in the case of pregnancy. Part III argues that 
pregnancy exclusion laws as they currently exist are further objectionable 
because they violate basic bioethical principles by restricting the autonomy 
of competent individuals to make informed decisions relating to their end-
of-life care. This argument is novel and will be critical if pregnancy 
exclusion statutes are narrowly upheld as constitutional in the future, and it 
also informs appropriate reforms to the existing laws. To conclude, Part IV 
proposes reforms to state pregnancy exclusion statutes that would bring them 
into compliance with both the Constitution and today’s bioethical principles. 
I. ADVANCE DIRECTIVES AND PREGNANCY EXCLUSION STATUTES 
Advance health care directives allow people to state their health care 
treatment wishes in anticipation of being unable to make those decisions, 
including their preferences to refuse or end life-sustaining medical 
treatment.27 Advance health care directives can be instructional, such as a 
living will that specifies treatment preferences in certain scenarios, or can 
designate a health care agent to make those decisions for the patient.28 To 
create a living will, a competent person signs a witnessed directive 
instructing a “physician to withhold or withdraw medical interventions” 
under certain future conditions if the person is unable to make medical 
decisions. 29  A living will could include instructions on “life support or 
breathing machines, the denial of tube feeding, and whether or not the 
individual would like her organs and tissues donated.”30 To create a durable 
health care power of attorney, a competent person signs a witnessed 
document designating a proxy “to make health care decisions” for the person 
if she becomes “unable to make such decisions” in the future.31 A person 
may choose to execute both a living will expressing her end-of-life wishes 
in specific situations, as well as a health care power of attorney to designate 
a decision-making proxy for potential situations not covered in a living 
will.32 
 
 26 497 U.S. 261, 284–87 (1990) (recognizing a patient’s right to remove life support if there is “clear 
and convincing evidence” of a patient’s wishes). This case prompted the creation of advance directives. 
See UNIF. HEALTH-CARE DECISIONS ACT prefatory note at 1 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1994). 
 27 See UNIF. HEALTH-CARE DECISIONS ACT §§ 2(a)–(b) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1994). 
 28 See id. Advance directives can also take the form of a hybrid approach, where the patient gives 
instructions for certain situations, and designates a proxy for other situations. See id. § 2(e). 
 29 PATIENTS RTS. COUNCIL, supra note 9. 
 30 Hannah Schwager, Note, The Implications of Exclusion: How Pregnancy Exclusions Deny Women 
Constitutional Rights, 13 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS J. 595, 597 (2015). 
 31 PATIENTS RTS. COUNCIL, supra note 9. 
 32 Villarreal, supra note 23. 
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When a health care proxy makes decisions on behalf of an incompetent 
patient, the agent engages in substitute decision-making by speaking for the 
patient—ultimately becoming the “voice of the principal.”33 This means that 
when a health care agent conveys that the wishes of a patient are to remove 
lifesaving medical treatment, it is legally the patient exercising her 
constitutional right.34 Accordingly, an action that conflicts with or ignores a 
proxy’s directives on behalf of a patient implicates the patient’s rights, rather 
than the proxy’s secondary exercise of that right. 35  Though dependent 
largely on state law, 36  a proxy is generally bound to make good-faith 
decisions on behalf of the patient, and such decisions can be challenged by 
individuals with standing who believe a decision is made in bad faith or is 
contrary to the patient’s wishes.37 There are a number of people who may 
serve as a health care agent depending on the patient’s preferences; however, 
the patient’s attending physician may not be appointed as a health care 
agent.38 
In the absence of advance directives, responsibility for an incompetent 
patient’s health care decisions usually falls to the patient’s spouse or next of 
kin.39 When health care agents are responsible for making end-of-life health 
care decisions for an incompetent patient, state law holds them to a 
“substituted judgment” standard, based on what they believe the patient 
would have chosen in that situation, or a “best interests” standard, which 
gives the agent more discretion to make decisions based on what they believe 
is best for the patient.40 Most courts use a “substituted judgment” standard 
 
 33 Wendy H. Sheinberg, In Matters of Life and Death: Do Our Clients Truly Give Informed Consent?, 
71 N.Y. ST. B.J. 36, 39 (1999). 
 34 See Sally J.T. Necheles, Individual Right to Refuse Treatment Despite Failure to Take Advantage 
of Statutory Mechanisms, 77 C.J.S. Right to Die § 9 (2019) (explaining that a health care proxy is not the 
only way for an individual to exercise his or her constitutional right to refuse life-sustaining treatment, as 
the court may appoint a conservator in some scenarios). 
 35 Catherine J. Jones, Decisionmaking at the End of Life, 63 AM. JUR. Trials 1 §§ 32–34 (2019); see 
Sheinberg, supra note 33, at 39–40. 
 36 All fifty states and the District of Columbia have statutes providing for a durable power of attorney. 
See Claire C. Obade, Patient Care Decision-Making: A Legal Guide for Providers § 11.2 (2018). 
 37 See, e.g., Sheinberg, supra note 33, at 40. 
 38 Jones, supra note 35, § 34. 
 39 Unif. Health-Care Decisions Act § 5(b) (providing that in the absence of an advance directive, 
decisions are to be made by surrogates in the following order: spouse, unless legally separated; adult 
child; parent; or adult sibling). 
 40 See, e.g., Lawrence A. Frolik & Linda S. Whitton, The UPC Substituted Judgment/Best Interest 
Standard for Guardian Decisions: A Proposal for Reform, 45 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 739, 739–40, 742–
43 (2012) (comparing the UPC’s old best interests standard which “instructs guardians to ‘consider the 
expressed desires and personal values of the ward’ when making decisions and to ‘at all times . . . act in 
the ward’s best interest,’” with the UPC’s new substituted judgment standard, which requires “guardians 
to consider what the incapacitated person would want”). 
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that evaluates whether the incompetent patient would have refused lifesaving 
medical treatment under the circumstances. 41  The most important 
consideration is the patient’s expressed wishes before becoming 
incompetent, such as any recent statements to family or friends about not 
wanting “to be a vegetable” or wanting to be sustained by life support.42 
State legislatures began developing pregnancy exclusion statutes 
around the 1980s in an effort to gain widespread “support for advance 
directives laws.” 43  Coming on the heels of an intense abortion debate 
surrounding Roe v. Wade,44 exceptions to advance directives laws that would 
protect fetuses helped make these laws more palatable to those who would 
otherwise be concerned about them.45 California was one of the first states 
to pass advance directives legislation in 1976 by legalizing patients’ 
directives to physicians to withhold or withdraw medical treatment.46 The 
ethical debate on the California Natural Death Act mainly focused on 
clarifying that the right to die a natural death did not facilitate patient suicide, 
allowing the potential consequences of the pregnancy exclusion to be largely 
overlooked.47 For instance, in explaining the features of the recently passed 
California Natural Death Act at a medical staff conference, the author of the 
legislation briefly explained that “[t]he clause that the directive could not be 
effectuated if the signator were pregnant was one of the collateral ethical 
issues we simply did not want to get involved in. It would have brought the 
whole question of abortion into the legislative dialogue.”48 
 
 41 Karl A. Menninger, Proof of Basis for Refusal or Discontinuance of Life-Sustaining Treatment on 
Behalf of Incapacitated Person, 40 AM. JUR. 3D Proof of Facts 287 § 13 & n.21 (2019) (providing 
examples of courts applying the substituted judgment standard). 
 42 Id. § 13. Courts also have evaluated other factors to infer what an incompetent patient would have 
decided, such as “[t]he patient’s age[,] [t]he probable side effects of treatment[,] [t]he likelihood that the 
treatment will cause suffering[,] [t]he patient’s reaction to medical treatment of others[,] [t]he patient’s 
religious beliefs[, and] [t]he patient’s prognosis with and without the treatment.” Id. 
 43 See Villarreal, supra note 23, at 1054 (explaining that state legislatures added pregnancy exclusions 
to advance directives laws to “sidestep the abortion debate”). 
 44 410 U.S. 113 (1973); see Villarreal, supra note 23, at 1054 (explaining that “limitations on advance 
directives for pregnant women have been part of the contentious fight around the ethics of abortion”). 
 45 Fernandez & Eckholm, supra note 1. 
 46 CAL. ANN. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 7185–7195 (1976) (repealed 2000); Charles P. Sabatino, 
The Evolution of Health Care Advance Planning Law and Policy, 88 MILBANK Q. 211, 213 (2010). 
 47 In the late 1970s, many doctors were “taught to regard death as an enemy and to do all they can to 
defeat it . . . [and] [m]any regard ‘pulling the plug’ as an act akin to euthanasia, which is forbidden by 
both law and the medical code.” A Life in the Balance, TIME, Nov. 3, 1975; see, e.g., California’s Natural 
Death Act—Medical Staff Conference, Univ. of Cal., San Francisco, 128 W.J. MED. 318, 326 (1978) (“It 
has never been labeled suicide for a patient to refuse treatment and such a decision has been invariably 
respected by physicians and by the law.”). 
 48 Id. at 322. 
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After the passage of advance directives legislation in California, forty-
one states followed suit and adopted similar advance directives legislation 
by 1986.49 In 1990, the Supreme Court addressed whether a person has a 
constitutional right to refuse lifesaving medical treatment in Cruzan v. 
Director, Missouri Department of Health. 50  The controversy focused on 
whether the parents of Nancy Cruzan, a patient in a persistent vegetative state 
caused by a car accident, could direct physicians to remove life-sustaining 
treatment because Nancy would have wanted that decision.51 The Court 
assumed that a competent patient has “a constitutionally protected right to 
refuse lifesaving hydration and nutrition,” and held that an incompetent 
patient’s surrogates may communicate the patient’s wishes to remove 
lifesaving medical treatment if they meet a high burden of proof.52 Shortly 
after Cruzan, Congress passed the Patient Self-Determination Act of 1991, 
which operates as an information mandate by requiring that medical facilities 
receiving Medicare or Medicaid funds inform patients of their right to 
establish advance directives and comply with applicable state law governing 
advance directives.53 However, the Act does not explicitly require medical 
facilities to inform pregnant patients that their advance directives may be 
voided according to applicable state law.54 
Currently, only fourteen states do not have a law restricting a physician 
from honoring a pregnant woman’s advance health care directives.55 The 
 
 49 See Sabatino, supra note 46, at 214. 
 50 Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 269 (1990). 
 51 Id. at 266–68. 
 52 Id. at 279–80. The Court noted that the majority of states would require a high burden of proof to 
show that “the patient would have indeed wanted to end the life-sustaining treatment.” Schwager, supra 
note 30, at 600. In this case, Missouri’s burden of proof was a “clear and convincing evidence” 
requirement, and the existence of advance directives would be sufficient to meet this requirement. Cruzan, 
497 U.S. at 280; Schwager, supra note 30, at 600. 
 53 42 U.S.C. § 1395cc(f) (2012). 
 54  Id.; MEGAN GREENE & LESLIE R. WOLFE, CTR. FOR WOMEN POLICY STUDIES, PREGNANCY 
EXCLUSIONS IN STATE LIVING WILL AND MEDICAL PROXY STATUTES 6 (2012), http://www.centerwo 
menpolicy.org/programs/health/statepolicy/documents/REPRO_PregnancyExclusionsinStateLivingWill
andMedicalProxyStatutesMeganGreeneandLeslieR.Wolfe.pdf [https://perma.cc/384Q-74K3] (arguing 
that “[o]ne of the biggest problems with pregnancy exclusions is that there is virtually no public awareness 
that they even exist, in part because there is no uniformity in the way in which pregnancy exclusion 
clauses are written into state statutes and they often appear under ambiguous or unrelated titles”); see also 
Letter from Katherine S. Kohari, MD, Asst. Professor & Associate Medical Dir., Yale School of Med. 
(Mar. 2, 2018) (writing in support of H.B. 5148). 
 55 As of December 2019, fourteen states do not have a “pregnancy exclusion” law: California, 
Hawaii, Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Mississippi, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Oregon, 
Tennessee, Virginia, West Virginia, and Wyoming. See infra app. However, states that do not have 
pregnancy exclusion laws may have “conscience clauses” in their respective advance directives 
legislation, which permit physicians to opt out of withholding life-sustaining treatment. See, e.g., HAW. 
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remaining thirty-six states have varying types of pregnancy exclusion laws 
that share one commonality in their statutes’ language: they restrict 
physicians from removing life-sustaining treatment from a patient. 56 
Assuming other state courts would interpret this language as the Texas state 
court did in 2014, the life-sustaining treatment requirement would not 
require physicians to prolong the use of artificial medical treatment to those 
who are deemed brain-dead; it would, however, require a physician to 
prolong treatment to patients in a persistent vegetative state, minimally 
conscious state,57 or other types of severe brain disabilities short of brain 
death where removing life support is contemplated.58 This Note focuses on 
women in a persistent vegetative state. 
 
REV. STAT. § 327E-7(e) (1999) (“A health-care provider may decline to comply with an individual 
instruction or health-care decision for reasons of conscience.”). 
 56 See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-3262 (2018); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19a-575a (2018); COLO. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-18-104(2) (2018); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 449A.451 (2018); S.C. CODE. ANN. 
§ 62-5-507 (2018); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 137-J:10 (2018); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 39-4510 (2019); VT. 
STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 9702 (2018); UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-2a-123 (2018); GA. CODE ANN. § 31-32-9 
(2018); 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 35/3(c) (2018); MD. CODE ANN. HEALTH–GEN. § 5-603 (2018); WIS. 
STAT. § 154.03 (2018); OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, § 3101.8(c) (2018); 20 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. 
§ 5429 (2018); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 23-06.5-09(5) (2017); ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 13.52.055(c) 
(2018); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 700.5512 (2018); ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-17-206(c) (2018); MONT. CODE 
ANN. § 50-9-202(3) (2019); ALA. CODE § 22-8A-4(e) (2018); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. 
§ 166.049 (West 2019); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 2503(j) (2018); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 311.629 
(2018); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-28, 103 (2016); IND. CODE § 16-36-4-8(d) (West 2017); FLA. STAT. ANN. 
§ 765.113 (2019); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 20-408 (2018); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:2H-56 (2018); 23 R.I. 
GEN. LAWS ANN. § 23-4.11-6(c) (2018); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 70.122.030 (2019); MINN. STAT. 
ANN. § 145B.13(3) (2019); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2133.06 (2018); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 34-12D-10 
(2018); IOWA CODE ANN. § 144A.6 (2018); MO. ANN. STAT. § 459.025 (2018). 
 57 See Fins, supra note 13 (“Unlike the vegetative state, [the minimally conscious state (MCS)] is a 
state of consciousness. MCS patients demonstrate unequivocal, but fluctuating, evidence of awareness of 
self and the environment. They may say words or phrases and gesture. They also may show evidence of 
memory, attention, and intention. . . . The prognosis can be fixed or open-ended, with rare occurrences of 
dramatic recoveries of emergence from MCS years and decades after injury.”). 
 58 See Judgment, supra note 6. While other states may not share the same interpretation of “life-
sustaining treatment,” a medical ethicist who helped write the Texas law at issue in the Muñoz case stated 
that the Texas court interpreted the statute correctly because the statute “applies only if the woman is 
alive.” Melissa Repko, Fort Worth Hospital Withdraws Life Support for Pregnant, Brain-Dead Woman, 
DALL. MORNING NEWS (Jan. 26, 2014, 11:37 PM), https://www.dallasnews.com/news/2014/01/27/ 
fort-worth-hospital-withdraws-life-support-for-pregnant-brain-dead-woman [https://perma.cc/3MRD-
8DGC]. However, a Georgia superior court has held that a brain-dead pregnant woman could not be 
removed from life support despite her husband’s wishes, reasoning that “the privacy rights of the mother 
are not a factor in this case because the mother is dead . . . .” Univ. Health Servs. Inc. v. Piazzi, No. CV86-
RCCV-464, at *416–17 (Ga. Super. Ct. Aug. 4, 1986), http://www.thaddeuspope.com/images/ 
Univrsity_Health_v_Piazzi_Ga_Sup_1986_.pdf [https://perma.cc/4MVZ-AGY2]. 
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Though the constitutionality of pregnancy exclusion laws has not yet 
been settled in U.S. courts,59 it has been questioned in recent years.60 For 
example, Hannah Schwager analyzed the constitutionality of pregnancy 
exclusion statutes by employing the Center for Women Policy Studies’ 
(CWPS) 2012 study. The study categorized state pregnancy exclusion laws 
into five groups based on restrictiveness: (1) the most restrictive states, (2) 
the Uniform Rights of the Terminally Ill Act (URTIA) states that restrict 
based on “probable development” of a fetus to live birth, (3) the viability 
standard states, (4) the silent states, and (5) the states that explicitly explain 
that a woman can specify in her advance directives her desires in the case of 
pregnancy. 61  Schwager focused her analysis only on CWPS’s most 
restrictive categories, arguing that states that void the advance directives of 
all pregnant patients, no matter the circumstances, violate the constitutional 
rights to terminate a nonviable pregnancy and to refuse lifesaving medical 
treatment.62 In her analysis, Schwager also only discussed cases where a 
pregnant woman’s end-of-life wishes have been executed in living wills, 
leaving a scholarly gap in how to apply these constitutional principles to 
situations where a health care agent expresses a pregnant patient’s end-of-
life wishes in the absence of specific advance directives. 63  Nikolas 
Youngsmith, another student author who, like Schwager, focused his 
analysis on the strictest form,64 has argued that using the abortion framework 
to analyze pregnancy exclusion statutes is misguided, and that pregnancy 
exclusion statutes should be analyzed as an unconstitutional infringement on 
the right to bodily autonomy.65 Finally, Elizabeth Villarreal recently applied 
a behavioral economic analysis to pregnancy exclusion laws to argue that 
advance directives law can be drafted to “more accurately capture women’s 
 
 59 See supra note 15. 
 60 See, e.g., Wendy Adele Humphrey, “But I’m Brain-Dead and Pregnant”: Advance Directive 
Pregnancy Exclusions and End-of-Life Wishes, 21 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 669 (2015) (arguing 
pregnancy exclusion laws implicate the rights to terminate a pregnancy and to refuse medical treatment); 
Schwager, supra note 30, at 607–23 (arguing pregnancy exclusion laws implicate the right to privacy, 
right to bodily integrity, gender discrimination, and potentially the Establishment Clause); Nikolas 
Youngsmith, Note, The Muddled Milieu of Pregnancy Exceptions and Abortion Restrictions, 49 COLUM. 
HUM. RTS. L. REV. 415 (2018) (arguing that pregnancy exclusion laws implicate the right to refuse 
lifesaving medical treatment, and that this framework is more appropriate to challenge pregnancy 
exclusion laws than the right to terminate a pregnancy); Villarreal, supra note 23 (arguing pregnancy 
exclusion laws appear to violate the constitutional rights to terminate a pregnancy and refuse unwanted 
medical treatment). 
 61 Schwager, supra note 30, at 601–07; see GREENE & WOLFE, supra note 54, at 3. 
 62 See Schwager, supra note 30, at 607, 614–20. 
 63 Id. at 597, 599. 
 64 Youngsmith, supra note 60, at 426. 
 65 Id. at 418–21, 434. 
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preferences and, in the process, provide women with greater individual 
autonomy.”66 
Building on this scholarship, this Note employs a new five-category 
typology to analyze the constitutional impact of pregnancy exclusion laws 
as they apply to all advance directives—both living wills and the use of 
health care proxies. It is necessary to create a new five-category typology in 
light of the complexity and variation of modern pregnancy exclusion laws, 
and because some future court may determine, contra this Note’s 
conclusions, that some categories of these laws are constitutional while 
others are not. 
Conducting an updated fifty-state survey, this Note categorizes current 
pregnancy exclusion laws into five general types based on restrictiveness. 
These categories reflect whether, when a pregnant patient is on life support, 
the laws treat her advance directives as (1) Void Per Se; (2) Void if the Fetus 
Can Develop to Birth at Some Level of Certainty; (3) Void Unless an Ethical 
Condition Is Met; or (4) Void Unless the Woman Specifically States “In the 
Case of Pregnancy”; the fifth category is for laws that (5) Honor Directives 
if Pregnant, Unless the Fetus Is Viable. In contrast, the CWPS study cited by 
Schwager grouped many states into a category called “the URTIA states,” 
and the URTIA provides that “a pregnant woman be given life-sustaining 
treatment if she is pregnant and if it is ‘probable’ that the fetus will develop 
to the point of ‘live birth.’”67 But this single categorization ignores important 
variations of the levels of certainty required by states in what this Note calls 
“Category Two” restrictions, which include not only “probable 
development” to live birth, but also “possible” development, or the absence 
of “reasonable medical certainty that a fetus could not be brought to term.”68 
These additional two levels of certainty are much broader than the URTIA’s 
term “probable,” and lead to important analytical outcomes when evaluating 
the constitutional effect of this language.69 The CWPS study also includes 
states such as New Hampshire, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, and South 
Dakota in “the URTIA states,” even though these states make certain 
exceptions based on physical harm to the woman or “severe pain which 
cannot be alleviated by medication.” 70  These states warrant their own 
category because they attempt to balance the rights of the woman and fetus 
in a way that is constitutionally problematic.71 This Part proceeds to explain 
 
 66 Villarreal, supra note 23, at 1052. 
 67 GREENE & WOLFE, supra note 54, at 3–4. 
 68 See infra Section I.B. 
 69 See infra Section II.A.2. 
 70 GREENE & WOLFE, supra note 54, at 4. 
 71 See infra Section I.C. 
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each of this Note’s five categories of pregnancy exclusion laws in further 
detail. 
A. Category One: Void Per Se 
As of December 2019, there are ten states that void a pregnant woman’s 
advance health care directives “per se” in all circumstances, no matter how 
far along the fetus is, whether it would cause the woman pain or harm, or 
whether the fetus could be brought to term without complications or 
deformities. 72  This category constitutes the most restrictive and 
constitutionally suspect type of pregnancy exclusion law out of all five 
categories. Category One laws prohibit a physician from removing life 
support from a pregnant woman despite a clear statement in her advance 
directives that that is what she wants—even if that woman directed that her 
end-of-life preferences would not change in the case of pregnancy.73 
B. Category Two: Void if the Fetus Can Develop to Birth at  
Some Level of Certainty 
Eleven states void a pregnant woman’s advance health care directives 
based on three different levels of knowledge the physician has about whether 
the fetus can potentially develop to live birth: (1) “probable,” (2) “possible,” 
or (3) unless there is “reasonable medical certainty” that the fetus cannot be 
 
 72 Those states are Alabama, Idaho, Indiana, Kansas, Michigan, Missouri, South Carolina, Texas, 
Utah, and Wisconsin. ALA. CODE § 22-8A-4(e) (2018) (“The advance directive for health care of a 
declarant who is known by the attending physician to be pregnant shall have no effect during the course 
of the declarant’s pregnancy.”); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 39-4510 (2018) (“If I have been diagnosed as 
pregnant, this Directive shall have no force during the course of my pregnancy.”); IND. CODE § 16-36-4-
8(d) (West 2017) (“The living will declaration of a person diagnosed as pregnant by the attending 
physician has no effect during the person’s pregnancy.”); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-28, 103 (2016) (“The 
declaration of a qualified patient diagnosed as pregnant by the attending physician shall have no effect 
during the course of the qualified patient’s pregnancy.”); MICH. COMP. LAWS. § 700.5512(1) (2018) (“A 
patient advocate cannot make a medical treatment decision . . . to withhold or withdraw treatment from a 
pregnant patient that would result in the pregnant patient’s death.”); MO. ANN. STAT.§ 459.025 (2018) 
(“The declaration to withdraw or withhold treatment by a patient diagnosed as pregnant by the attending 
physician shall have no effect during the course of the declarant’s pregnancy.”); S.C. CODE. ANN. § 62-
5-507 (2018) (“If a principal has been diagnosed as pregnant, life-sustaining procedures may not be 
withheld or withdrawn pursuant to the health care power of attorney during the course of the principal’s 
pregnancy.”); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 166.049 (West 2019) (“A person may not withdraw 
or withhold life-sustaining treatment under this subchapter from a pregnant patient.”); UTAH CODE ANN. 
§ 75-2a-123(1) (2018) (“A health care directive that provides for the withholding or withdrawal of life 
sustaining procedures has no force during the course of a declarant’s pregnancy.”); WIS. STAT. 
§ 154.03(2) (2018) (“If you know that the patient is pregnant, this document [DECLARATION TO 
PHYSICIANS] has no effect during her pregnancy.”). 
 73  See Villarreal, supra note 23, at 1059 (explaining that laws that “automatically invalidate a 
woman’s living will . . . are indifferent to whether the living will was created prior to or during a 
pregnancy, or whether the will specifically contemplates the possibility that the writer may become 
pregnant”). 
114:969 (2020) Decisions in the Dark 
983 
born.74 Six states void a pregnant woman’s advance directives if a physician 
determines it is “probable” the fetus can develop to live birth or viability,75 
while four do so if a physician determines it is “possible.”76 Ohio voids a 
pregnant woman’s advance directives unless there is a “reasonable degree of 
medical certainty . . . that the fetus would not be born alive.”77 Under any of 
these state laws, if a physician finds that the required level of certainty of a 
 
 74 Those states are Alaska, Arkansas, Delaware, Illinois, Iowa, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, 
Nevada, Ohio, and Rhode Island. Of these three sub-categories, “probable” is the least restrictive and 
“reasonable medical certainty” is the most restrictive. 
 75 Importantly, Alaska and Delaware’s pregnancy exclusion statutes contain the permissive language 
“may not be given effect,” instead of the more standard mandatory language of “cannot,” “shall not,” and 
“shall be given no force” contained in the pregnancy exclusion statutes of Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, 
and Rhode Island. It is ambiguous whether the apparently permissive language would be interpreted as 
to allow hospitals to void a pregnant woman’s advance directives, rather than require hospitals to void 
them, as in the states with mandatory language. Compare ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 13.52.055(b) (2018) 
(“[A]n advance health care directive by a patient or a decision by the person then authorized to make 
health care decisions for a patient may not be given effect if[:] (1) the patient is a woman who is pregnant 
and lacks capacity . . . [and] it is probable that the fetus could develop to the point of live birth if the life-
sustaining procedures were provided.”), and DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 2503(j) (2018) (“A life-sustaining 
procedure may not be withheld or withdrawn from a patient known to be pregnant, so long as it is probable 
that the fetus will develop to be viable outside the uterus with the continued application of a life-sustaining 
procedure.”), with MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-9-202(3) (2019) (“Life-sustaining treatment cannot be 
withheld or withdrawn pursuant to a declaration from an individual known to the attending 
physician . . . to be pregnant so long as it is probable that the fetus will develop to the point of live birth 
with continued application of life-sustaining treatment.”), NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 20-408(3) (2018) 
(“Life-sustaining treatment shall not be withheld or withdrawn pursuant to a declaration from an 
individual known to the attending physician to be pregnant so long as it is probable that the fetus will 
develop to the point of live birth with continued application of life-sustaining treatment.”), NEV. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 449A.451 (2018) (“Life-sustaining treatment must not be withheld or withdrawn pursuant 
to a declaration from a qualified patient known to the attending physician . . . to be pregnant so long as it 
is probable that the fetus will develop to the point of live birth with continued application of life-sustaining 
treatment.”), and 23 R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 23-4.11-6(c) (2018) (“The declaration of a qualified patient 
known to the attending physician to be pregnant shall be given no force or effect as long as it is probable 
that the fetus could develop to the point of live birth with continued application of life sustaining 
procedures.”). 
 76 ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-17-206(c) (2018) (“The declaration of a qualified patient known to the 
attending physician to be pregnant must not be given effect as long as it is possible that the fetus could 
develop to the point of live birth with continued application of life-sustaining treatment.”); 755 ILL. 
COMP. STAT. ANN. 35/3(c) (2018) (“The declaration of a qualified patient diagnosed as pregnant by the 
attending physician shall be given no force and effect as long as in the opinion of the attending physician 
it is possible that the fetus could develop to the point of live birth with the continued application of death 
delaying procedures.”); IOWA CODE ANN. § 144A.6 (2018) (“The declaration of a qualified patient known 
to the attending physician to be pregnant shall not be in effect as long as the fetus could develop to the 
point of live birth with continued application of life-sustaining procedures.”); MINN. STAT. ANN. 
§ 145B.13(3) (2019) (“[T]he living will must not be given effect as long as it is possible that the fetus 
could develop to the point of live birth with continued application of life-sustaining treatment.”). 
 77 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2133.06 (2018) (“Life-sustaining treatment shall not be withheld or 
withdrawn from a declarant . . . if the declarant is pregnant . . . unless the declarant’s attending physician 
and one other physician . . . determine, to a reasonable degree of medical certainty . . . that the fetus would 
not be born alive.”). 
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live birth or viability is met, then the physician is required to void the 
woman’s advance health care directives (or, in the cases of Alaska and 
Delaware, they are at least enabled to)—even if the woman clearly stated 
that her end-of-life preferences would not change in the case of pregnancy.78 
C. Category Three: Void Unless an Ethical Condition Is Met 
Five states currently void a pregnant woman’s advance directives based 
on the existence of at least one condition that takes into account potential 
health consequences to the pregnant woman or the chance the fetus could 
develop to term. Kentucky voids a pregnant woman’s advance directives 
unless treatment (1) will not permit live birth, (2) “will be physically harmful 
to the woman,” or (3) will “prolong severe pain which cannot be alleviated 
by medication.” 79  Similarly, New Hampshire, North Dakota, and South 
Dakota void a pregnant woman’s advance directives unless (1) the fetus will 
not develop to live birth, (2) treatment will be “physically harmful” or 
“unreasonably painful” to the woman, or (3) treatment will “prolong severe 
pain that cannot be alleviated by medication.” 80  Lastly, Pennsylvania’s 
 
 78 See GREENE & WOLFE, supra note 54, at 4 (explaining that the URTIA originally included the 
phrase “unless the declaration otherwise provides,” but this phrase was ultimately removed from its final 
form—ensuring that advance directives would still be voided “regardless of the woman’s expressed 
desires to the contrary”). 
 79  KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 311.629(4) (2018) (“Notwithstanding the execution of an advance 
directive, life sustaining treatment and artificially-provided nutrition and hydration shall be provided to 
a pregnant woman unless, to a reasonable degree of medical certainty, as certified on the woman’s 
medical chart by the attending physician and one (1) other physician who has examined the woman, the 
procedures will not maintain the woman in a way to permit the continuing development and live birth of 
the unborn child, will be physically harmful to the woman or prolong severe pain which cannot be 
alleviated by medication.”). 
 80 N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 137-J:10 (2018) (“Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to condone, 
authorize, or approve: (a) The consent to withhold or withdraw life-sustaining treatment from a pregnant 
principal, unless, to a reasonable degree of medical certainty, . . . such treatment or procedures will not 
maintain the principal in such a way as to permit the continuing development and live birth of the fetus 
or will be physically harmful to the principal or prolong severe pain which cannot be alleviated by 
medication.”); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 23-06.5-09(5) (2017) (“Notwithstanding a contrary direction 
contained in a health care directive executed under this chapter, health care must be provided to a pregnant 
principal unless, to a reasonable degree of medical certainty . . . such health care will not maintain the 
principal in such a way as to permit the continuing development and live birth of the unborn child or will 
be physically harmful or unreasonably painful to the principal or will prolong severe pain that cannot be 
alleviated by medication.”); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 34-12D-10 (2018) (“Notwithstanding a declaration 
made pursuant to this chapter, life-sustaining treatment and artificial nutrition and hydration shall be 
provided to a pregnant woman unless, to a reasonable degree of medical certainty, . . . such procedures 
will not maintain the woman in such a way as to permit the continuing development and live birth of the 
unborn child or will be physically harmful to the woman or prolong severe pain which cannot be alleviated 
by medication.”). 
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statute is similar to these with an additional requirement honoring a woman’s 
advance directive if it is probable the fetus cannot be brought to a live birth.81 
Based on the language used in the state statute variations, physicians 
hold great power over whether they will choose to honor or void a pregnant 
woman’s advance directives due to the medical determinations required to 
apply the statute, and must only take the above considerations into account. 
This is because “[n]o doctor, judge or legislative body can possibly 
determine with any certainty when a fetus has reached a point in 
development at which it will ‘probably’ reach live birth.”82 
Furthermore, anecdotal evidence suggests that physicians experience 
confusion on exactly what the law requires when treating pregnant patients 
in a persistent vegetative state. For example, there has been at least one case 
where Pennsylvania physicians rejected a family’s requests to remove 
lifesaving treatment from a pregnant patient in a persistent vegetative state.83 
The physicians there cited the Pennsylvania law to justify continued 
treatment, though they disagreed about the right thing to do.84 The physicians 
acknowledged the great weight of the decision they were forced to make 
under the law, and reported that there were “strongly held differences of 
opinion among the caregivers”—some feeling “uncomfortable with the 
decision to maintain [the] patient on artificial nutrition and a ventilator” and 
some feeling “her family’s initial request to withdraw life support should 
have been honored.”85 
D. Category Four: Void Unless the Woman Specifically  
States “In the Case of Pregnancy” 
Nine states provide a clear option for a woman to state in advance health 
care directives what her wish would be in the case of pregnancy.86 These 
 
 81 20 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5429(a)(2018) (“Notwithstanding the existence of a living 
will, a health care decision by a health care representative or health care agent or any other direction to 
the contrary, life-sustaining treatment, nutrition and hydration shall be provided to a pregnant woman 
who is incompetent and has an end-stage medical condition or who is permanently unconscious unless, 
to a reasonable degree of medical certainty . . . life-sustaining treatment, nutrition and hydration: (1) will 
not maintain the pregnant woman in such a way as to permit the continuing development and live birth 
of the unborn child; (2) will be physically harmful to the pregnant woman; or (3) will cause pain to the 
pregnant woman that cannot be alleviated by medication.”). 
 82 GREENE & WOLFE, supra note 54, at 6. 
 83 See Romagano et al., supra note 24, at 107, 110. 
 84 See id.; 20 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5429. 
 85 Romagano et al., supra note 24, at 110. 
 86  Those states are Arizona, Florida, Oklahoma, Connecticut, Georgia, Maryland, New Jersey, 
Vermont, and Washington. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 765.113 (2019); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-3262 (2018) 
(“Notwithstanding my other directions, if I am known to be pregnant, I do not want life-sustaining 
treatment withheld or withdrawn if it is possible that the embryo/fetus will develop to the point of live 
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types of laws may still void a pregnant woman’s advance health care 
directives that direct a physician to remove life-sustaining treatment if there 
is no specification in her advance directives about how those preferences 
would change in the case of pregnancy.87 Furthermore, in the absence of 
advance directives, these types of laws may also prohibit a physician from 
honoring the decision of a pregnant woman’s health care agent to remove 
life support, even if the fetus is not viable.88 
E. Category Five: Honor if Pregnant, Unless the Fetus Is Viable 
Colorado is the only state with a pregnancy exclusion statute that honors 
a pregnant woman’s advance health care directives to remove life-sustaining 
treatment before viability, even if the woman does not state specifically if 
her preferences would change in the case of pregnancy.89 Under Colorado’s 
statute, a physician must honor a woman’s advance directives to remove life-
sustaining treatment if the fetus is not yet viable and must void a woman’s 
advance directives if the fetus is viable.90 This law also allows physicians to 
honor the decisions of a health care agent in the absence of advance 
directives as long as this decision is made prior to fetal viability. 91 
Furthermore, this law should not allow physicians to honor a health care 
agent’s request to maintain life support of a pregnant woman pre-viability if 
the woman had advance directives directing removal of life support.92 This 
could potentially place physicians in an uncomfortable position if there is 
 
birth with the continued application of life-sustaining treatment.”); OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, § 3101.8(c) 
(2018) (“[T]he pregnant patient shall be provided with life-sustaining treatment and artificially 
administered hydration and nutrition, unless the patient has specifically authorized, in her own words, 
that during a course of pregnancy, life-sustaining treatment and/or artificially administered hydration 
and/or nutrition shall be withheld or withdrawn.”); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19a-575a (2018); GA. 
CODE ANN. § 31-32-9 (2018); MD. CODE ANN. HEALTH–GEN. § 5-603 (2018); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:2H-
56 (2018); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 9702 (2018); WASH REV. CODE ANN. § 70.122.030 (2019). 
 87 See statutes cited supra note 86. Arizona does not automatically void a pregnant woman’s advance 
health care directive if there is no specification about how her preferences would change in the case of 
pregnancy, but rather may void a directive if it is “possible that the embryo/fetus will develop to the point 
of live birth with the continued application of life-sustaining treatment.” ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-
3262 (2018). 
 88 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 765.113 (“Unless the principal expressly delegates such authority to 
the surrogate in writing, or a surrogate or proxy has sought and received court approval . . . a surrogate 
or proxy may not provide consent for . . . [w]ithholding or withdrawing life-prolonging procedures from 
a pregnant patient prior to viability . . . .”). 
 89 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-18-104(2) (2018) (“In the case of a declaration of a qualified patient 
known to the attending physician to be pregnant, a medical evaluation shall be made as to whether the 
fetus is viable. If the fetus is viable, the declaration shall be given no force or effect until the patient is no 
longer pregnant.”). 
 90 Id. 
 91 See id. §§ 15-18-104(1)–(2). 
 92 See id. 
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compelling evidence that the woman would have changed her mind and 
wanted to sustain the fetus to birth.93 
II. UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATE PREGNANCY  
EXCLUSION STATUTES 
The five categories of state pregnancy exclusion laws described above 
raise substantial concerns when analyzed in light of a woman’s constitutional 
right to decide not to continue a pregnancy and to refuse lifesaving medical 
treatment.94 This Part argues that all categories of pregnancy exclusion laws 
that void a woman’s advance directives or her health care agent’s directives 
to remove life support before fetal viability are unconstitutional under the 
Planned Parenthood v. Casey “undue burden” framework.95 Furthermore, 
such statutes violate the constitutional right to refuse unwanted lifesaving 
medical treatment under Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of 
Health.96 Part II provides an overview of the constitutional rights articulated 
in Casey and Cruzan, and applies those frameworks to all five categories of 
pregnancy exclusion statutes. 
A. Right to Terminate a Pregnancy 
First, it is appropriate to analyze pregnancy exclusion statutes under an 
abortion restriction framework because pregnancy exclusion laws are 
“driven by a desire on the part of state governments to ensure, to the extent 
legally possible, that pregnant women carry their fetuses to term.” 97 
Similarly, pregnancy exclusion statutes show a preference for bringing the 
fetus to term over the right of the pregnant woman to refuse unwanted 
medical treatment, suggesting the laws are guided by the same motivation to 
 
 93 However, an argument could be made that the advance directive is maximally reflective of her 
wishes. See infra notes 195–205 and accompanying text. 
 94 See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992); Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dept. of 
Health, 497 U.S 261 (1990). 
 95 Casey, 505 U.S. at 878. 
 96 Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 286–87. State constitutions may be even more protective of these rights than 
the U.S. Constitution because many states explicitly protect a “privacy” right, unlike the U.S. 
Constitution, in which the right to privacy is not an explicit right but is derived from a substantive due 
process theory. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 846–47; infra note 111; Privacy Protections in State Constitutions, 
NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES (Nov. 7, 2018), http://www.ncsl.org/research/ 
telecommunications-and-information-technology/privacy-protections-in-state-constitutions.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/2YG7-G7JL] (“Constitutions in 11 states—Alaska, Arizona, California, Florida, 
Hawaii, Illinois, Louisiana, Montana, New Hampshire, South Carolina and Washington—have explicit 
provisions relating to a right to privacy.”). However, this analysis is outside the scope of this Note. 
 97 Youngsmith, supra note 60, at 419; Schwager, supra note 30, at 614 (arguing pregnancy exclusion 
statutes “violate the female patient’s right to abortion, especially those statutes which automatically 
invalidate a woman’s advance directive upon a pregnancy diagnosis”). 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
988 
protect the “potentiality of life.”98 Because most pregnancy exclusion laws 
void the advance directives of all pregnant women, even if they stated their 
wishes would not change in the case of pregnancy, it is evident that 
“accurately capturing a woman’s preferences cannot be legislators’ only 
concern.”99 
However, one can question whether the abortion restriction framework 
appropriately applies to pregnancy exclusion statutes because there are some 
fundamental differences between abortion restriction laws and pregnancy 
exclusion laws. For instance, Youngsmith argues that analyzing pregnancy 
exclusion statutes as a violation of the right to terminate a nonviable 
pregnancy is misguided because “those who would seek to have a pregnant 
woman’s advance directive enforced are not seeking an abortion of the fetus, 
but rather seeking the proper administration of that woman’s choice of her 
own end-of-life care.” 100  One important distinction between pregnancy 
exclusion statutes and abortion restrictions is that “abortion restrictions stop 
women from getting the health care that they want or need; [but] pregnancy 
exceptions forcibly subject women to health care that they neither require 
nor desire.”101 The enforcement of advance directives functionally ends a 
pregnancy as a byproduct of dying a natural death; however, a woman is not 
so much deciding that she affirmatively wants to abort the fetus as she is 
deciding she does not want to artificially have her body be kept alive for use 
as an incubator. 102  These types of scenarios were undoubtedly not 
contemplated when Roe and Casey were decided, and this Note does not 
argue that pregnant women in persistent vegetative states are fundamentally 
the same as pregnant women who want to seek abortions.103 
Nonetheless, pregnancy exclusion statutes should still be analyzed 
under Casey, along with Cruzan, because the Court instructed that laws 
aimed at protecting the future life of a fetus must be balanced against the 
 
 98 See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 162 (1973). 
 99 Villarreal, supra note 23, at 1054. 
 100 Youngsmith, supra note 60, at 418. 
 101 Id. at 419, 439 (arguing pregnancy exclusion statutes “reach beyond abortion regulations, legally 
forcing women to essentially act as hosts, supporting a fetus which would not survive without modern 
medicine”). 
 102 Id. 
 103  Id. Youngsmith also notes that the abortion restriction framework actually “provides for 
significant limitations on the autonomy rights of pregnant women” compared to the right to refuse 
lifesaving medical treatment because “[i]f [only] the rules of the abortion cases apply to advance 
directives, then incompetent pregnant women face a built-in—and misapplied—set of rights restrictions, 
carved out over time by Roe, Casey, and other cases.” Id. at 448. For this reason, the arguments advanced 
in Section II.B of this Note regarding the right to refuse lifesaving medical treatment are less controversial 
than the arguments regarding the right to terminate a nonviable pregnancy, and thus may be more useful 
to any constitutional challenge of pregnancy exclusion laws.  
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burden placed on the mother.104 This overarching principle of the right to 
bodily autonomy does not limit itself to abortion specifically, but applies to 
broader scenarios allowing pregnant women to make their own decisions. 
Thus, Casey stands for the principle that a state cannot interfere with a 
pregnant woman’s pregnancy-terminating health care decisions pre-viability 
in the interest of protecting the fetus, and this rule applies to pregnancy 
exclusion laws where the termination of pregnancy is a byproduct of the 
health care decision to die a natural death.105 
Additionally, it is appropriate to analyze pregnancy exclusion statutes 
as abortion restrictions because, like abortion restrictions, pregnancy 
exclusion laws seek to ensure that as many fetuses as possible are brought to 
term. 106  Pregnancy exclusion statutes place a higher value on the fetus 
coming to term than the right of the pregnant woman to make autonomous 
decisions, suggesting the laws are guided by the motivation to protect the 
“potentiality of life.”107 Because most pregnancy exclusion laws void the 
advance directives of all pregnant women, even if they stated their wishes 
would not change in the case of pregnancy, it is evident that “accurately 
capturing a woman’s preferences cannot be legislators’ only concern.”108 In 
this sense, pregnancy exclusion laws “represent an unprecedented and 
extraordinary step beyond abortion restrictions” because unlike abortion 
restrictions, which prohibit action a pregnant woman wants to take, 
pregnancy exclusions “mandate action that a pregnant woman must take 
despite her clearly indicated intentions.”109 
The right to an abortion is grounded in the U.S. Constitution’s Due 
Process Clauses, in both the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, which state 
 
 104 Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 874–79 (1992). 
 105  Id. at 846. But see David McQuoid-Mason, Does Withdrawing Treatment from a Pregnant 
Persistent Vegetative State Patient Resulting in Her Death Constitute a Termination of Pregnancy?, 8 S. 
AFR. J. BIOETHICS & L. 8, 9 (2015) (explaining that withdrawing life support from a pregnant patient in 
a persistent vegetative state is not classified as a termination of pregnancy because it is “merely the natural 
consequence of a pregnant PVS mother dying”). 
 106 Schwager, supra note 30, at 614 (noting that opponents of pregnancy exclusion statutes argue that 
they “violate the female patient’s right to abortion [before the fetus is viable], especially those statutes 
which automatically invalidate a woman’s advance directive upon a pregnancy diagnosis”); Youngsmith, 
supra note 60, at 419 (admitting that a “common thread . . . weaves through pregnancy exceptions and 
state limits on abortion: both seek to inhibit the medical decisions of pregnant women in an effort to 
protect fetal life”); Anna North & Catherine Kim, The “Heartbeat” Bills that Could Ban Almost All 
Abortions, Explained, VOX (June 28, 2019, 9:50 AM), https://www.vox.com/policy-and-
politics/2019/4/19/18412384/abortion-heartbeat-bill-georgia-louisiana-ohio-2019 
[https://perma.cc/AK32-4A7L] (explaining that the justification for state heartbeat bills, which ban 
abortions as early as six weeks after conception, is to “‘save lives’”). 
 107 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 162 (1973). 
 108 Villarreal, supra note 23, at 1054. 
 109 Youngsmith, supra note 60, at 433–34. 
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that no person shall be deprived of “life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law.” 110  Modern jurisprudence concludes that the concept of 
liberty in the Due Process Clause guarantees protection of certain 
fundamental rights.111 The Supreme Court first held that a right to privacy in 
reproductive decision-making is one such due process right fundamental to 
one’s personal liberty when it decided Griswold v. Connecticut in 1965.112 
In 1973, the Supreme Court extended this right in Roe v. Wade when it held 
that the right to privacy encompasses a woman’s decision to terminate a 
pregnancy and determined that the state’s interest in preserving fetal life only 
reaches its “compelling” point at fetal viability.113 In reaching its decision, 
the Supreme Court was guided by a set of concerns raised by situations in 
which a woman did not have the choice to have an abortion, such as forcing 
a woman to take care of an additional life and potential psychological 
harm.114 The Court in Roe v. Wade set up a trimester framework giving 
women an absolute right to terminate a pregnancy during the first trimester, 
with the option for states to impose more stringent restrictions in the last two 
trimesters when their interests in maternal health and potential fetal life are 
more compelling.115 
 
 110 U.S. CONST. amend. V, XIV; see Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833,846–47 
(1992). 
 111 See, e.g., Casey, 505 U.S. at 846–49. The fundamental rights derived from the concept of liberty 
in the Due Process Clause are considered “substantive due process” rights, and there exists controversy 
around their legitimacy. See, e.g., Christopher R. Green, Twelve Problems with Substantive Due Process, 
16 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 397 (2018) (criticizing the substantive due process doctrine); Timothy 
Sandefur, In Defense of Substantive Due Process, or the Promise of Lawful Rule, 35 HARV. J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 283, 284 (2012) (“Perhaps no doctrine in constitutional law has produced so much calumny as the 
theory commonly known as substantive due process.”). 
 112 381 U.S. 479, 485–86 (1965) (holding that the fundamental right to privacy encompasses the right 
of married couples to use contraceptives). 
 113 410 U.S. 113, 153, 163 (1973). 
 114 Id. at 153 (“The detriment that the State would impose upon the pregnant woman by denying this 
choice altogether is apparent. Specific and direct harm medically diagnosable even in early pregnancy 
may be involved. Maternity, or additional offspring, may force upon the woman a distressful life and 
future. Psychological harm may be imminent.”). 
 115 Id. at 163–65. According to the trimester framework outlined in Roe, a woman’s right to terminate 
a pregnancy is unregulated in the first trimester. Id. at 163. During the second trimester, “a State may 
regulate the abortion procedure to the extent that the regulation reasonably relates to the preservation and 
protection of maternal health.” Id. The Court provided certain examples of what would constitute 
permissible state regulation in the second trimester, such as “the qualifications of the person who is to 
perform the abortion; as to the licensure of that person; as to the facility in which the procedure is to be 
performed, that is, whether it must be a hospital or may be a clinic or some other place of less-than-
hospital status; as to the licensing of the facility; and the like.” Id. During the third trimester, a woman’s 
right to terminate a pregnancy may be legally denied by a state because the state’s interest in protecting 
fetal life becomes compelling after viability “except when it is necessary to preserve the life or health of 
the mother.” Id. at 163–64. 
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In 1992, in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, the Supreme Court 
reaffirmed the central holding of Roe v. Wade regarding the existence of a 
fundamental right to terminate a pregnancy, but the plurality reframed that 
right as the right to terminate a pregnancy without an “undue burden” from 
the state. 116  Furthermore, the Court in Casey changed the trimester 
framework to the current “fetal viability” framework in determining when 
the state’s interest in the potential life of a fetus could become compelling 
enough to justify restrictions that override a woman’s right to terminate her 
pregnancy.117 By enacting this change, the Court allowed states to impose 
more restrictions on a woman’s right to terminate a pregnancy before 
viability than was previously permissible under the trimester framework, as 
long as those restrictions did not operate as undue burdens.118 The undue 
burden test from Casey states that regulations that have the purpose or effect 
of presenting a substantial obstacle to a woman who seeks an abortion before 
viability impose an undue burden on that right, and are therefore invalid.119 
Even though fetal viability serves as a crucial line in defining a woman’s 
right to an abortion without an undue burden, it is also important to note that 
the Supreme Court emphasized in Casey that a state’s compelling interest in 
potential fetal life after viability can still be overcome if the mother’s life 
would be threatened by continuing the pregnancy.120 
In 2016, in Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, the Supreme Court 
clarified how lower courts should apply the undue burden test by explaining 
that the “rule announced in Casey . . . requires that courts consider the 
burdens a law imposes on abortion access together with the benefits those 
laws confer.” 121  Following this decision, courts have applied the undue 
 
 116 505 U.S. at 879–901 (plurality opinion) (holding that Pennsylvania’s Abortion Control Act’s 
provisions requiring informed consent, a 24-hour waiting period, and parental consent were not an undue 
burden). 
 117  Id. at 860 (“[V]iability marks the earliest point at which the State’s interest in fetal life is 
constitutionally adequate to justify a legislative ban on nontherapeutic abortions.”). According to the 
“fetal viability” framework, if a fetus is not yet viable (“the time at which there is a realistic possibility 
of maintaining and nourishing a life outside the womb”), a woman has the right to terminate the pregnancy 
without an undue burden by the state. Id. at 870. An undue burden exists “if its purpose or effect is to 
place a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion before the fetus attains viability.” 
Id. at 878. If a fetus is determined to be viable, a woman may be legally denied an abortion because the 
state’s interest in protecting fetal life becomes compelling enough to outweigh the woman’s right to 
terminate the pregnancy, except when the abortion is necessary to preserve the life or health of the mother. 
Id. at 860, 879. 
 118 Id. at 877. 
 119 Id. (“[A] statute which, while furthering the interest in potential life or some other valid state 
interest, has the effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman’s choice cannot be 
considered a permissible means of serving its legitimate ends.”). 
 120 Casey, 505 U.S. at 879.  
 121 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2309 (2016). 
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burden test by weighing the benefits of restrictions against the burden on a 
woman’s right to terminate her pregnancy.122 As a result, scholars have noted 
that it has become easy for state abortion restrictions to survive the undue 
burden test.123 Although pregnancy exclusion laws are not about abortion 
specifically, the principles of undue burdens and fetal viability are thus 
applicable to evaluating pregnancy exclusion laws under Casey’s abortion 
restriction framework, which is what this Section proceeds to do.124 
1. Category One: Void Per Se 
Based on Casey’s framework, it follows that Category One state 
pregnancy exclusion laws, which never honor a woman’s advance health 
care directives, even when she clearly communicates her wishes to refuse 
treatment in the case of pregnancy (and, by implication, end the pregnancy), 
are unconstitutional in cases where the fetus is not viable.125 Under the undue 
burden test, Category One laws that automatically void the advance 
directives of pregnant patients constitute undue burdens by restricting “a 
woman from exercising her right to abortion whether the fetus is developed 
 
 122 See, e.g., Whole Woman’s Health v. Paxton, 280 F. Supp. 3d 938, 947–53 (W.D. Tex. 2017) 
(analyzing the constitutionality of restrictions that imposed penalties on physicians who performed a 
standard procedure for a second-trimester abortion, by weighing the benefits of the restrictions with the 
burdens). 
 123 See, e.g., Linda J. Wharton et al., Preserving the Core of Roe: Reflections on Planned Parenthood 
v. Casey, 18 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 317, 385 (2006) (explaining multiple ways courts have manipulated 
the undue burden standard to “substantially undermine Roe’s core protections”); see also Linda 
Greenhouse & Reva B. Siegel, Casey and the Clinic Closings: When “Protecting Health” Obstructs 
Choice, 125 YALE L.J. 1428, 1476, 1478 (2016) (explaining that “judgments about which burdens are 
undue will vary across contexts” and can depend “on the manner in which the state is vindicating its 
interest in regulating abortion”); Chelsea M. Donaldson, Note, Constitutional Law/Reproductive 
Justice—Breaking the Trap: How Whole Woman’s Health Protects Abortion Access, and the Substantive 
Due Process Clause’s Rebuke of Anti-Abortion Regulations, 40 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 257, 282 (2018) 
(arguing that the “cloudiness surrounding the ‘undue burden’ standard has led to many clashes of thought 
within the court system, allowing for legislatures to make the argument that any state interest (ranging 
from protecting women’s health to the potentiality of life) is justifiable against the undue burden it places 
upon a woman’s right to seek and obtain an abortion”). 
 124 See supra Section II.A. 
 125  Category One states include Alabama, Idaho, Indiana, Kansas, Michigan, Missouri, South 
Carolina, Texas, Utah, and Wisconsin. ALA. CODE § 22-8A-4(e) (2018); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 39-4510 
(2019); IND. CODE § 16-36-4-8(d) (West 2017); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-28, 103(a) (2016); MICH. COMP. 
LAWS § 700.5512(1) (2018); MO. ANN. STAT. § 459.025 (2018); S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-5-507 (2018); 
TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 166.049 (West 2019); UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-2a-123 (2018); WIS. 
STAT. § 154.03 (2018); see Schwager, supra note 30, at 615 (arguing that automatic statutes voiding the 
advance directives of pregnant patients is inconsistent with Casey); Villarreal, supra note 23 (arguing that 
the most restrictive state statutes appear to be unconstitutional because they represent an undue burden of 
a woman’s right to terminate a pregnancy); Humphrey, supra note 60, at 692 (arguing that “pregnancy 
exclusions that automatically invalidate a woman’s advance directive impose a substantial obstacle in the 
path of a woman seeking to terminate her pregnancy when the fetus is non-viable, and thus likely violate 
the ‘undue burden’ test set forth in Casey”); see also Youngsmith, supra note 60, at 442 (arguing that 
states with “the most severe pregnancy exceptions” conflict with the right to bodily autonomy). 
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to 22 weeks or simply two days.”126 Under the undue burden standard, if a 
woman has advance health care directives clearly communicating that she 
wants to be removed from life-sustaining treatment even if she is pregnant, 
then in the event of incapacitation the woman’s physicians should honor her 
request to suspend life support, provided the fetus is not yet viable. Because 
the statutory language does not allow a physician to suspend life support for 
a pregnant woman under any circumstances, this functionally prevents the 
woman from terminating her pregnancy before fetal viability, despite a 
manifestation of intent to do so. Thus, Category One laws present a 
substantial obstacle to exercising the constitutional rights enshrined in Roe 
and Casey. 
Even where a woman’s advance directives instruct a physician to 
remove life support but do not clarify whether she would want to remove life 
support in the case of pregnancy, Category One laws are still unconstitutional 
under Casey because these laws do not respect a woman’s competent 
decision to terminate a pregnancy before viability, under the assumption that 
every woman would change her mind despite what health care directives say. 
These laws also unconstitutionally restrict the decisions of health care agents 
acting on behalf of the incapacitated woman, as in the Marlise Muñoz case, 
where the physicians refused the husband’s request to take his wife off life 
support. 127  Health care agents have the power to engage in substitute 
decision-making on behalf of an incapacitated person, meaning that when a 
health care agent conveys that a pregnant patient would want to remove life 
support to die a natural death, the agent operates as the patient legally 
exercising her constitutional right.128 
Accordingly, restricting the right of health care agents to terminate the 
principal’s pregnancy before viability operates as an undue burden on the 
woman’s right to terminate a pregnancy by placing the decision in the hands 
of an attending physician instead—an actor who is notably prohibited by law 
to act as a health care agent for their own patient.129 Thus, these laws not 
only prevent competent pregnant women from exercising their right to pre-
viability abortion by voicing their decisions in advance, but also prevent 
incompetent women from exercising their right by voicing their decisions 
through health care agents.130 These laws therefore operate as undue burdens 
by providing no option at all to exercise the right to a pre-viability abortion, 
 
 126 GREENE & WOLFE, supra note 54, at 5. 
 127 See supra notes 1–12 and accompanying text. 
 128 See supra notes 33–35 and accompanying text. 
 129 Jones, supra note 35, at § 34. 
 130 GREENE & WOLFE, supra note 54, at 5. 
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though two alternative ways can certainly exist through the use of a living 
will or a health care proxy.131 
2. Category Two: Void if the Fetus Can Develop to Birth at Some  
Level of Certainty 
Category Two state pregnancy exclusion laws, which require 
physicians to void a pregnant woman’s advance directives based on a 
physician’s determination of whether it is “possible” or “probable” that the 
fetus could be brought to live birth or viability, as well as Ohio’s law 
requiring a “reasonable degree of medical certainty” that a fetus could not be 
born alive, also constitute undue burdens on a woman’s right to terminate 
her pregnancy.132 All of these standards are difficult for physicians to apply 
due to vagueness and because it is “difficult to determine if a pregnancy will 
develop to a live birth since these cases are rare and the prognosis of many 
of these fetuses is poor or unknown.” 133  Despite advances in medical 
technology with the ability to sustain a fetus to term,134 the treatment of 
pregnant women in a persistent vegetative state for this particular purpose is 
not standardized and there is no guidance as to how a physician would 
interpret these terms.135 
The language of whether it is “possible” that the fetus could be brought 
to live birth is similarly broad enough to be met in all cases of pregnancy 
 
 131 See id.  
 132 Category Two states include Alaska, Arkansas, Delaware, Illinois, Iowa, Minnesota, Montana, 
Nebraska, Nevada, Ohio, and Rhode Island. ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 13.52.055(b) (2018); ARK. CODE 
ANN. § 20-17-206(c) (2018); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 2503(j) (2018); 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. 
ANN. 35/3(c) (2018); IOWA CODE ANN. § 144A.6 (2018); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 145B.13(3) (2019); 
MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-9-202(3) (2019); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 20-408 (2018); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 449A.451 (2018); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2133.06 (2018); 23 R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 23-4.11-6(c) 
(2018); see Schwager, supra note 30, at 616 (arguing that terms like “probable” are too vague and 
subjective, and thus likely present an undue burden to the right to terminate a pregnancy); Villarreal, 
supra note 23, at 1067 (arguing that states who “force women to accept unwanted medical care if it is 
‘possible’ or ‘probable’ the fetus will develop to have a ‘live birth’ may also be violating the Constitution” 
because the standards are too all-encompassing); Humphrey, supra note 60, at 692 (arguing that 
pregnancy exclusion statutes with the terms “probable” and “live birth” are phrased too broadly and 
constitute an undue burden on the right to terminate a pregnancy); GREENE & WOLFE, supra note 54, at 
6 (arguing the term “probable live birth” is too vague and all-encompassing that it “creates the same 
problem that arises with statutes that invalidate advance directives for pregnant patients altogether”). 
 133 Villarreal, supra note 23, at 1060. 
 134 Esmaeilzadeh et al., supra note 16, at 79–80. 
 135 Romagano et al., supra note 24, at 107; cf. Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 192 (1973) (defining 
medical judgment broadly by stating it “may be exercised in the light of all factors—physical, emotional, 
psychological, familial, and the woman’s age—relevant to the well-being of the patient. All these factors 
may relate to health. This allows the attending physician the room he needs to make his best medical 
judgment.”). 
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with today’s advanced medical technology. 136  “Possible” is defined by 
Merriam-Webster as “being within the limits of ability, capacity, or 
realization,” “being something that may or may not occur,” or “being 
something that may or may not be true or actual.” 137  Under this broad 
definition of “possible,” considering the advanced medical technology that 
can sustain a fetus in an incapacitated body for the entire term of 
pregnancy,138 it will almost always be “possible” with today’s technology 
that a fetus could be brought to term.139 Thus, the four state statutes140 that 
void a woman’s advance directives if it is “possible” that the fetus could be 
born alive pose undue burdens under Casey by presenting a substantial 
obstacle to exercising the right to terminate a pregnancy before viability. 
Similarly, the statutes that require a physician to void a pregnant 
woman’s advance health directives if it is “probable” that a fetus could be 
brought to live birth are also so all-encompassing that they would require 
voiding a pregnant woman’s advance directives in most pregnancy 
circumstances.141 “Probable” implies a greater than fifty-percent chance, and 
is defined by Merriam-Webster as “supported by evidence strong enough to 
establish presumption but not proof,” “establishing a probability,” or “likely 
to be or become true or real.”142 These broad and obscure definitions of 
“probable” do not give meaningful guidance to physicians on how to make 
a determination of whether it is probable a fetus could develop to term. 
Further, while “probable” is a more demanding standard in this context than 
“possible,” the existence of modern prenatal technology that can sustain a 
fetus in an incapacitated body seem to make it “probable” the fetus could 
 
 136 The term “possible” is even less restrictive than the term “probable,” so it creates the same 
problem of vagueness and overly broad application. 
 137  Possible, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/ 
possible [https://perma.cc/W88L-TZRH]. 
 138 Romagano et al., supra note 24, at 107–08.  
 139 Cf. GREENE & WOLFE, supra note 54, at 6. 
 140 These states include Arkansas, Illinois, Iowa, and Minnesota. ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-17-206(c) 
(2018); 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 35/3(c) (2018); IOWA CODE ANN. § 144A.6 (2018); MINN. STAT. 
ANN. § 145B.13(3) (2019). 
 141 These states include Alaska, Delaware, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, and Rhode Island. ALASKA 
STAT. ANN. § 13.52.055(b) (2018); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 2503(j) (2018); MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-
9-202(3) (2017); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 20-408(3) (2018); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 449A.451 (2018); 
23 R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 23-4.11-6(c) (2018). For discussion regarding these statutes’ breadth, see 
GREENE & WOLFE, supra note 54, at 6 (“The term[] ‘probable live birth’ is extremely vague and can be 
easily be stretched to encompass any stage of pregnancy. A fetus will ‘probably’ develop to live birth 
from any point in development as long as the woman carrying it continues to receive life-prolonging 
treatment, barring severe complications.”). 
 142  Probable, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/ 
probable [https://perma.cc/XN8M-RGLY]. 
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develop to live birth in nearly all cases143—even if that results in harm to the 
woman or deformities to the fetus, because these statutes do not appear to 
consider what condition the fetus is born in, as long as it is technically alive. 
Thus, statutes that void a woman’s advance directives if it is “probable” that 
the fetus could be born alive also operate as undue burdens under Casey by 
presenting a substantial obstacle to exercising the right to terminate a 
pregnancy before viability. 
Finally, Ohio’s pregnancy exclusion law, which voids a pregnant 
woman’s advance directives unless there is a “reasonable degree of medical 
certainty”144 that the fetus would not be born alive, is even more restrictive 
than the previous two levels of certainty, given advances in prenatal care.145 
Only in exceptional cases would a physician be able to determine it is 
“reasonably certain” that the fetus would not develop to live birth with the 
assistance of today’s advanced medical technology, given that the statute 
does not consider whether the fetus is born with deformities or 
complications.146 Ohio’s law thus seems to function in practice as a Category 
One law, rendering advance directives void per se. Overall, these broad 
statutes impose significant restrictions that qualify as undue burdens on a 
woman’s ability to terminate her pregnancy before viability, and they should 
be considered unconstitutional under Casey. Thus, Category Two state 
pregnancy exclusion laws are also unconstitutional. 
3. Category Three: Void Unless an Ethical Condition Is Met 
Category Three state pregnancy exclusion laws attempt to balance the 
rights of the woman and fetus in a way that is nonetheless still 
constitutionally problematic under Casey.147 Generally, these laws provide 
that physicians must void the advance directives of pregnant women unless 
sustaining treatment “will not maintain the woman in a way to permit the 
continuing development and live birth” of the fetus, will be “physically 
harmful to the woman,” or will “prolong severe pain which cannot be 
 
 143 Esmaeilzadeh et al., supra note 16, at 75, 80 (explaining potential technological needs to sustain 
fetal life in women who are brain-dead or in a persistent vegetative state, including mechanical respiratory 
ventilation, cardiovascular support and monitoring, endocrine support, thermoregulation, warming 
blankets, and nutritional support). 
 144 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2133.06 (2018). 
 145 See, e.g., Romagano et al., supra note 24 (describing extensive medical interventions to protect a 
fetus developing in its brain-dead mother). It is important to note that advanced technologies are not yet 
at the point of erasing the concept of “viability.” See id. 
 146 Id. (explaining the ventilator and nutritional technological support that can sustain a fetus to live 
birth after the mother experiences clinical brain-death). 
147 These states include Kentucky, New Hampshire, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, and South Dakota. 
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 311.629 (2018); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 137-J:10 (2018); N.D. CENT. CODE 
ANN. § 23-06.5-09(5) (2017); 20 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5429(a) (2018); S.D. CODIFIED 
LAWS § 34-12D-10 (2018). 
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alleviated by medication.” 148  These types of laws appear to provide 
physicians with more flexibility to take into account the dignitary rights of 
an incapacitated pregnant woman by considering physical harm and severe 
pain,149 though “if a pregnant woman is ‘unable to communicate verbally or 
nonverbally,’ whether or not severe pain has been ‘alleviated by medication’ 
is a matter of sheer speculation by the physician.”150 However, these laws 
operate as undue burdens because they completely ignore the concept of 
present fetal viability, as Casey demands.151 Instead, these laws focus on 
future fetal viability by voiding advance directives even if the fetus is not 
viable at that moment, unless the fetus is likely not to survive. Thus, based 
on the face of the statutory language, even if such laws appear to balance the 
dignitary interests of the pregnant woman with the interests of the state, they 
 
 148 See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 311.629 (2018) (“Notwithstanding the execution of an advance 
directive, life sustaining treatment and artificially-provided nutrition and hydration shall be provided to 
a pregnant woman unless, to a reasonable degree of medical certainty . . . the procedures will not maintain 
the woman in a way to permit the continuing development and live birth of the unborn child, will be 
physically harmful to the woman or prolong severe pain which cannot be alleviated by medication.”); 
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 137-J:10 (2018) (“Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to condone, 
authorize, or approve: (a) The consent to withhold or withdraw life-sustaining treatment from a pregnant 
principal, unless, to a reasonable degree of medical certainty . . . such treatment or procedures will not 
maintain the principal in such a way as to permit the continuing development and live birth of the fetus 
or will be physically harmful to the principal or prolong severe pain which cannot be alleviated by 
medication.”); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 23-06.5-09(5) (2017) (“Notwithstanding a contrary direction 
contained in a health care directive executed under this chapter, health care must be provided to a pregnant 
principal unless, to a reasonable degree of medical certainty . . . such health care will not maintain the 
principal in such a way as to permit the continuing development and live birth of the unborn child or will 
be physically harmful or unreasonably painful to the principal or will prolong severe pain that cannot be 
alleviated by medication.”); 20 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. § 5429 (2018) (“Notwithstanding the 
existence of a living will, a health care decision by a health care representative or health care agent or any 
other direction to the contrary, life-sustaining treatment, nutrition and hydration shall be provided to a 
pregnant woman who is incompetent and has an end-stage medical condition or who is permanently 
unconscious unless, to a reasonable degree of medical certainty . . . life-sustaining treatment, nutrition 
and hydration: (1) will not maintain the pregnant woman in such a way as to permit the continuing 
development and live birth of the unborn child; (2) will be physically harmful to the pregnant woman; or 
(3) will cause pain to the pregnant woman that cannot be alleviated by medication.”); S.D. CODIFIED 
LAWS § 34-12D-10 (2018) (“Notwithstanding a declaration made pursuant to this chapter, life-sustaining 
treatment and artificial nutrition and hydration shall be provided to a pregnant woman unless, to a 
reasonable degree of medical certainty . . . such procedures will not maintain the woman in such a way 
as to permit the continuing development and live birth of the unborn child or will be physically harmful 
to the woman or prolong severe pain which cannot be alleviated by medication.”). 
 149 See Schwager, supra note 30, at 603 (noting these types of laws “provide for more leeway” for 
physicians). Note that Schwager’s framework categorizes pregnancy exclusion laws differently and calls 
these laws “Category Two,” while the framework in this Note puts them in Category Three. Id. 
 150 Hope E. Matchan & Kathryn E. Sheffield, Adding Constitutional Depravation to Untimely Death: 
South Dakota’s Living Will Pregnancy Provision, 37 S.D. L. REV. 388, 389 (1992) (citation omitted). 
 151 Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 860 (1992) (“[V]iability marks the earliest 
point at which the State’s interest in fetal life is constitutionally adequate to justify a legislative ban on 
nontherapeutic abortions.”). 
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could also justify voiding the advance directives of an incapacitated woman 
who is only one week pregnant and therefore fail under Casey. 
4. Category Four: Void Unless the Woman Specifically States “In 
the Case of Pregnancy” 
Category Four state pregnancy exclusion laws—which void a woman’s 
advance directives if she does not specifically state her wishes “in the case 
of pregnancy”—allow physicians to honor a pregnant woman’s advance 
directives to remove life support if these specify that her wishes would be 
the same in the case of pregnancy. 152  However, these laws are still 
unconstitutional because they prohibit physicians from honoring the decision 
of health care agents to terminate a woman’s pregnancy before fetal viability 
in cases where a woman did not clearly communicate what her decision 
would be in the case of pregnancy. As mentioned above,153 health care agents 
have the power to exercise substituted decision-making on behalf of an 
incapacitated person, meaning that a proxy’s decision to remove life support 
for a pregnant patient operates as the patient legally exercising her 
constitutional right.154 This right is respected in the abortion context when a 
health care proxy communicates that an incompetent person would have 
wanted to terminate a pregnancy legally, 155  and accordingly should be 
respected in this context where a health care agent instructs a physician to 
remove life support, where ending a pregnancy is merely the byproduct of a 
medical decision. Restricting the right of health care agents to suspend life 
support of a pregnant person before fetal viability, functionally terminating 
the pregnancy, is an undue burden on the woman’s right to terminate a 
pregnancy. 
5. Category Five: Honor if Pregnant, Unless the Fetus Is Viable 
Finally, Colorado’s Category Five pregnancy exclusion law, which 
honors a woman’s advance directives before viability even if she does not 
specify her preferences in the case of pregnancy, is unconstitutional because 
it fails to include an exception after viability to save the life or health of the 
 
 152 These states include Florida, Arizona, Oklahoma, Connecticut, Georgia, Maryland, New Jersey, 
Vermont, and Washington. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 765.113 (2019); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-3262 (2018); 
OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, § 3101.8(c) (2018); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19a-575a (2018); GA. CODE ANN. 
§ 31-32-9 (2018); MD. CODE ANN. HEALTH–GEN. § 5-603 (2018); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:2H-56 (2018); 
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 9702 (2018); WASH REV. CODE ANN. § 70.122.030 (2019). 
 153 See supra notes 33–35 and accompanying text. 
 154 See Necheles, supra note 34, § 9. 
 155 See Hilary Mabel et al., Decision-Making for an Incapacitated Pregnant Patient, 47 HASTINGS 
CTR. REP. 12, 12–15 (2017) (describing a case that came before a clinical ethics team where an 
incompetent pregnant patient’s mother was deemed her health care surrogate, and instructed physicians 
to terminate her daughter’s eighteen-week pregnancy based on her daughter’s previous abortions and the 
health risks of the pregnancy). 
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mother. At first glance, Colorado’s Category Five law may appear to pass 
constitutional muster under Casey because it requires physicians to honor a 
pregnant woman’s advance directives to remove life support so long as the 
fetus is not viable, and thus arguably respects the right to terminate a 
pregnancy before fetal viability without undue burden from the state.156 This 
law also allows physicians to honor the decisions of a health care agent to 
suspend life support in the absence of advance directives so long as this 
decision is made prior to viability.157 
However, Colorado’s Category Five pregnancy exclusion law is still 
unconstitutional because the law directs physicians to void the advance 
directives of pregnant patients after viability, and yet fails to include an 
exception after viability to save the life or health of the mother, which Casey 
demands.158 It is unclear whether a “life or health” exception post-viability 
would apply in this context, given that an incapacitated pregnant patient 
would be kept alive to sustain a fetus; thus, this theory hinges on whether a 
woman’s health would suffer severe harm if the pregnancy were sustained. 
Furthermore, as described in Part III, this law is ethically problematic 
because it risks restricting the autonomy of individuals to make informed 
decisions about their end-of-life care through a health care agent when there 
is overwhelming evidence that a woman would not have intended to suspend 
life support in the event of a nonviable pregnancy.159 That is, from the face 
of the law’s language, it appears a doctor could not honor a health care 
agent’s request to maintain life support of a pregnant woman if the advance 
directive ordered removal but did not address the issue of pregnancy, which 
could potentially place physicians in an uncomfortable position when there 
is compelling evidence that the woman would have changed her mind.160 
 
 156 COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-18-104(2) (2018) (“In the case of a declaration of a qualified patient 
known to the attending physician to be pregnant, a medical evaluation shall be made as to whether the 
fetus is viable. If the fetus is viable, the declaration shall be given no force or effect until the patient is no 
longer pregnant.”). 
 157 See id. §§ 15-18-104(1)–(2), (7)–(8). 
 158 Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 879 (1992) (explaining that a woman may 
be legally denied an abortion after viability because the state’s interest in protecting fetal life becomes 
compelling enough to outweigh the woman’s right to terminate the pregnancy, except when the abortion 
is necessary to preserve “the life or health of the mother”). 
 159 See infra Part III. 
 160 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-18-104(2) (2018) (“In the case of a declaration of a qualified patient 
known to the attending physician to be pregnant, a medical evaluation shall be made as to whether the 
fetus is viable. If the fetus is viable, the declaration shall be given no force or effect until the patient is no 
longer pregnant.”). 
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B. Right to Refuse Lifesaving Medical Treatment 
In addition to violating a woman’s constitutional right to terminate her 
pregnancy, all state pregnancy exclusion laws violate the constitutional right 
of a competent person to refuse unwanted lifesaving medical treatment.161 In 
Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health, the Supreme Court 
decided that a competent person has a constitutionally protected liberty 
interest in making their own health care decisions, including refusing 
unwanted lifesaving medical treatment.162 The Court acknowledged that an 
incompetent patient’s health care surrogates may be required by the state to 
demonstrate clear and convincing evidence that the patient would have 
wanted to refuse lifesaving treatment; 163  however, advance directives 
expressly stating a patient would want to remove lifesaving treatment meet 
this burden of proof.164 As a result of the Cruzan decision, advance directives 
became common tools to exercise the constitutional right to refuse lifesaving 
medical treatment.165 
Courts have further held that the right to refuse lifesaving medical 
treatment extends to family members and health care agents. In an influential 
case, In re Quinlan, the New Jersey Supreme Court held that a person’s right 
to privacy under the U.S. Constitution can be asserted on their behalf by their 
guardian or family members, who may decide whether to remove life-
sustaining treatment for that person in the absence of advance directives or a 
living will.166 While the U.S. Supreme Court has ruled that a person does not 
have a “right to die” with active aid by physicians,167 the right to refuse 
 
 161 Competence to sign legal testamentary documents is generally referred to as “mental capacity,” 
which means one must have a sound mind to execute certain legal documents. See generally Robert 
Whitman, Capacity for Lifetime and Estate Planning, 117 PA. ST. L. REV. 1061 (2013) (discussing 
various capacity standards in legal transactions). The definitions of legal competence vary by jurisdiction, 
but generally focus on “cognitive aspects of decisions, especially the patient’s abilities to comprehend 
information, to communicate choices, or to communicate rational choices.” Allen C. Snyder, Competency 
to Refuse Lifesaving Treatment: Valuing the Nonlogical Aspects of a Person’s Decisions, 10 ISSUES IN L. 
& MED. 299, 307 (1994). 
 162 497 U.S. 261, 279 (1990) (“[F]or the purposes of this case, we assume that the United States 
Constitution would grant a competent person a constitutionally protected right to refuse lifesaving 
hydration and nutrition.”). 
 163 Id. at 280. 
 164 Schwager, supra note 30, at 600. 
 165 See id. at 600–01. 
 166 In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 661 (N.J. 1976) (holding a person’s right to privacy could be asserted 
on her behalf by her guardian); Michele Yuen, Comment, Letting Daddy Die: Adopting New Standards 
for Surrogate Decisionmaking, 39 UCLA L. REV. 581, 597–98 (1992) (explaining the importance of In 
re Quinlan in allowing a guardian to exercise substituted judgment in making a decision to remove life 
support of a patient). 
 167  Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 705–06, 709–10 (1997) (reasoning that history, 
traditions, and practice support the constitutionality of criminalizing physician-assisted suicide). 
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medical treatment outlined in Cruzan and Quinlan illustrates a constitutional 
right to die if the means are passive.168 
Similarly, the state’s interest in preserving potential human life should 
never overcome a person’s constitutional right to refuse unwanted lifesaving 
medical treatment.169 At least one state has acknowledged that parents have 
the right to refuse life-sustaining treatment for infants born extremely 
prematurely who have terminal complications or diseases.170 There are also 
numerous cases of courts holding that a pregnant woman has the right to 
refuse a cesarean section procedure needed to save the life of her viable fetus 
because forced medical treatment would unconstitutionally infringe on that 
woman’s personal liberty.171 While there have been some cases where courts 
have ignored a pregnant woman’s objections and subsequently forced her to 
submit to a cesarean section procedure, these cases based their analysis on 
weighing the state’s interest in the potential life of a fetus against the right to 
an abortion.172 However, courts should be weighing the state’s interest in the 
potential life of a fetus with the right to refuse lifesaving medical treatment—
where no state interest in potential life should overcome this right—rather 
 
 168 Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dept. of Health, 497 U.S 261, 284 (1990); In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d at 672 
(1976). 
 169  Several courts have held that this right to remove life-sustaining medical treatment, and 
subsequently die a natural death, cannot be overcome by the state’s interests in preserving human life 
because forcing medical treatment infringes on personal liberty. See, e.g., Tune v. Walter Reed Army 
Med. Hosp., 602 F. Supp. 1452, 1456 (D.D.C. 1985) (holding a competent, terminally ill patient has the 
right to refuse life support); In re Guardianship of Browning, 568 So.2d 4, 14–15, 17 (Fla. 1990) 
(rejecting a judicial procedure requiring a surrogate to get court approval for health care decisions because 
the state’s interests were not substantial enough to outweigh the constitutional right to refuse medical 
treatment through a surrogate); In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209, 1223 (N.J. 1985) (stating the state’s interest 
in preserving human life is typically outweighed by a person’s right to refuse life-sustaining medical 
treatment); Superintendent of Belchertown State Sch. v. Saikewic, 370 N.E.2d 417, 425–26 (Mass. 1977) 
(contending the state has a significant interest in preserving human life, which is outweighed when the 
illness is incurable). 
 170 See HCA, Inc. v. Miller ex rel. Miller, 36 S.W.3d 187, 191 (Tex. Comm’n App. 2000) (“[U]nless 
a child’s need for life-sustaining medical is too urgent for consent to be obtained from a parent . . . a 
doctor’s treatment of the child without such consent is actionable even if the condition requiring treatment 
would eventually be life-threatening . . . .”). 
 171 See e.g., In re A.C., 573 A.2d 1235, 1240, 1252 (D.C. App. 1990) (acknowledging the right of a 
pregnant woman to refuse a cesarean section needed to save the potential life of her twenty-six-week-old 
fetus); see also In re Baby Boy Doe, 632 N.E.2d 326, 333–34 (Ill. App. 1994) (recognizing the right of a 
pregnant woman to refuse a cesarean section needed to save the life of her fetus, and finding the state’s 
interest in potential life not compelling enough to override this right). 
 172 See Raleigh Fitkin-Paul Morgan Mem’l Hosp. v. Anderson, 201 A.2d 537, 538 (N.J. 1964) 
(directing trial court to issue order requiring blood transfusions to be performed on a pregnant mother in 
her thirty-second week of pregnancy if necessary to save the woman and the fetus); see also Lynn M. 
Paltrow & Jeanne Flavin, Arrests of and Forced Interventions on Pregnant Women in the United States, 
1973–2005: Implications for Women’s Legal Status and Public Health, 38 J. H. POL. POL’Y & L. 299, 
317 (2013) (describing additional cases where pregnant women have been forced to submit to medical 
interventions). 
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than analyzing these types of cases under the abortion restriction framework 
that seemingly allows for more permissive restrictions after viability.173 
To illustrate the critical difference between weighing state interests 
under the abortion restriction framework and the right-to-refuse-medical-
treatment framework, In re A.C. is instructive.174 There, a patient with cancer 
was pregnant with a viable fetus and was very close to death.175 The patient 
was forced to submit to a cesarean section procedure, and tragically the baby 
and mother died shortly after.176 The D.C. Court of Appeals held that a near-
death pregnant patient with a viable fetus has the right to decide whether to 
submit to a medical procedure under the principle that “courts do not compel 
one person to permit a significant intrusion upon his or her bodily integrity 
for the benefit of another person’s health.”177 The court distinguished from 
other cases where courts have forced pregnant women with viable fetuses to 
submit to cesarean section procedures by explaining that these courts “have 
usually acted to vindicate the state’s interest in protecting third parties, even 
if in fetal state.”178 The court instead held that the interest in protecting fetal 
life was not compelling enough to override the right to refuse medical 
treatment, explaining: 
This right of bodily integrity belongs equally to persons who are 
competent and persons who are not. Further, it matters not what the 
quality of a patient’s life may be; the right of bodily integrity is not 
extinguished simply because someone is ill, or even at death’s door. To 
protect that right against intrusion by others—family members, doctors, 
hospitals, or anyone else, however well-intentioned—we hold that a 
court must determine the patient’s wishes by any means available, and 
must abide by those wishes unless there are truly extraordinary or 
compelling reasons to override them. When the patient is incompetent, 
or when the court is unable to determine competency, the substituted 
judgment procedure must be followed.179 
Thus, the requirement of competence does not create an opening for 
state lawmakers and physicians to void advance health care directives when 
a pregnant woman is in a persistent vegetative state. The court clarified that 
 
 173 See supra note 169 and accompanying text; see also Villarreal, supra note 23, at 1067 (arguing 
that “the state’s interest may never be strong enough to justify violating a woman’s bodily autonomy, 
regardless of how far along she is in a pregnancy”). 
 174 In re A.C., 573 A.2d at 1238, 1252 (acknowledging the right of a pregnant woman to refuse a 
cesarean section needed to save the potential life of her twenty-six-week-old fetus). 
 175 Id. at 1238. 
 176 Id. 
 177 Id. at 1243–44. 
 178 Id. at 1246. 
 179 Id. at 1247 (citation omitted). 
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even if a pregnant woman is declared incompetent and is unable to make an 
informed decision, the court must execute substituted judgment in making 
the decision.180 
While some scholars have argued that a pregnant woman in a persistent 
vegetative state who has advance directives to remove life-sustaining 
treatment has no current liberty interests at stake in that scenario,181 this 
position fundamentally ignores other legal schemes designed to allow 
individuals to exercise their liberty interest preemptively. For example, 
organ donation also involves a strong interest in keeping other people alive, 
yet the law in that arena demands that physicians only sustain people to 
prepare for organ donation with their previous consent. 182  Furthermore, 
individuals are free to communicate their desires in advance about how their 
bodily remains should be handled and cared for, and these autonomous 
decisions are respected under the law even after an individual dies.183 These 
legal schemes demonstrate that the principle of respecting a person’s bodily 
autonomy and wishes, even after death, should prevent physicians from 
overriding a woman’s clearly communicated treatment preferences to 
prioritize the potential life of a fetus. 
 
 180 Id. at 1248–49. 
 181 See Bertha A. Manninen, Sustaining a Pregnant Cadaver for the Purpose of Gestating a Fetus: A 
Limited Defense, 26 KENNEDY INST. OF ETHICS J. 399, 404 (2016) (“An insentient pregnant woman 
cannot suffer the physical or emotional burdens of continued medical treatment or pregnancy, and thus 
arguably does not possess current interests in bodily integrity or procreative liberty.” (quoting Katherine 
A. Taylor, Compelling Pregnancy at Death’s Door, 7 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 85, 116 (1997)). 
 182 David Orentlicher et al., Organ Transplantation: The Control, Use, and Allocation of Body Parts, 
in BIOETHICS & PUB. HEALTH L. 305 (3d ed., 2013). Some scholars who favor extinguishing rights at 
death, and thus support voiding the advance directives of pregnant women receiving life-sustaining 
treatment, also support organ donation for all patients who pass even if they do not consent because “[n]o 
one has the right to say what should be done to their body after death.” See H. E. Emson, It Is Immoral to 
Require Consent for Cadaver Organ Donation, 29 J. MED. ETHICS 125 (2003). An argument was made 
in Portugal that if a pregnant woman is designated as an organ donor, then that woman provides consent 
to sustain her fetus to term. See Portugal Baby Born to Woman Brain Dead for Three Months, supra note 
19 (explaining that the decision to keep a fetus sustained in a brain-dead Portuguese woman was based 
on the fact that “she had never opted out of Portugal’s presumed-consent organ donation law,” and that 
“[b]eing a donor is not just about being in a position to donate a liver or heart or lung, but also being in a 
position to give yourself so a child can live”). This argument is flawed with respect to the U.S., given that 
sustaining a pregnant woman to develop a fetus, a genetically distinct life form that serves no specific 
function beyond its own individual development, is categorically different from sustaining a pregnant 
woman to preserve her organs, which are groups of cells and tissues that perform specific functions in a 
human body. Compare Fetus (Medical Definition), MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, 
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/fetus [https://perma.cc/3PK5-NVXW], with Organ 
(Medical Definition), MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/ 
organ [https://perma.cc/G9WE-JXDT]. 
 183 See NORMAN L. CANTOR, AFTER WE DIE: THE LIFE AND TIMES OF THE HUMAN CADAVER 29 
(2010) (explaining that human remains “receive[] a variety of entitlements and protections . . . such as 
decent disposal of a cadaver, quiet repose, and postmortem human dignity”). 
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Given that courts have recognized the right to refuse life-sustaining 
treatment as a fundamental right, it is never appropriate to void a pregnant 
woman’s clearly communicated wishes to suspend life support, even after 
viability.184 Therefore, in cases where a statute orders a physician to override 
a woman’s clearly communicated advance directives to remove life-
sustaining treatment in the case of pregnancy, all categories of state 
pregnancy exclusion laws violate the woman’s right to refuse unwanted 
lifesaving medical treatment. Even in cases where the fetus is viable, placing 
the state’s interest (under Casey) in protecting the fetus against the patient’s 
right to die with dignity, the state must lose. First, there is no constitutional 
right to be born,185 so the state’s assertion of such a right must yield to the 
patient’s recognized constitutional right to refuse treatment.186 Second, to 
refuse to honor the patient’s right is to turn her into an artificial womb for an 
unwanted fetus, reducing her to no more than an apparatus. 187  Such an 
affront to human dignity could not be consistent with a constitutional right 
to elect to die with dignity.188 
Furthermore, even if the woman’s advance directives do not clearly 
state whether her end-of-life decisions would change in the case of 
pregnancy, that lack of clarification only means that the decision should be 
shifted to her health care agent or family members, who would then exercise 
“substituted judgment” in making a decision that the woman would have 
wanted given the circumstances. 189  Under no circumstances should the 
legislature’s or physician’s judgment override that of either the patient or her 
health care agent. Therefore, all pregnancy exclusion statutes violate the 
patient’s constitutional right to refuse unwanted lifesaving medical treatment 
as recognized in Cruzan. 
 
 184 Others may reasonably disagree that the state should never void a pregnant woman’s express 
advance directives to remove life support after viability, and there may be some point where a state’s 
interest in potential human life overrides a woman’s right to refuse lifesaving medical treatment. See 
Elizabeth A. Marcuccio & Joseph P. McCollum, Advance Directives Containing Pregnancy Exclusions: 
Are They Constitutional?, 34 N.E. J. L. STUD. 22, 34–35 (2015) (noting that the fundamental right to 
refuse unwanted medical treatment is not absolute and can potentially be less compelling than the state’s 
interest in potential human life). Consider, for example, a pregnant woman past her due date falling into 
a persistent vegetative state after an accident. In this exceptional circumstance, perhaps a state may be 
justified in removing a full-term fetus through a cesarean section procedure before the mother’s life-
support is removed, but not in maintaining the patient on life support to further develop the fetus. 
 185 See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 162 (1973) (“[T]he unborn have never been recognized in the 
law as persons in the whole sense.”). 
 186 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (establishing the supremacy of constitutional rights). 
 187 Youngsmith, supra note 60, at 442. 
 188 See id. 
 189 See supra note 40 and accompanying text. 
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III. BIOETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS OF STATE PREGNANCY  
EXCLUSION STATUTES 
Even if pregnancy exclusion laws are found to be constitutional or are 
upheld in a narrow fashion, these laws raise serious ethical concerns about 
whether physicians should be required to void a woman’s autonomous 
decision. These concerns are heightened when physicians are forced to 
maintain life support under state law even when the patient has clear 
directives expressing that she would not want continued treatment. In the 
absence of clear directives from the patient or her proxy, these laws still raise 
ethical concerns because physicians are required to maintain life-sustaining 
treatment, even if continued treatment would cause serious pain or physical 
harm to the woman, and even if the fetus would likely face deformities or 
complications if brought to term.190 This Part explains general bioethical 
principles for resolving ethical issues, explains the current bioethics issues 
with pregnancy exclusion laws, and addresses how health care proxies can 
ease lawmaker concerns that a woman would have changed her mind if she 
knew she was pregnant. 
The standard biomedical ethics approach to resolving ethical issues and 
determining the appropriate course of action is to balance four principles: (1) 
autonomy, (2) beneficence, (3) non-maleficence, and (4) justice.191 First, to 
balance autonomy, physicians should best determine what the wishes of the 
patient are in order to respect his or her autonomy.192 This principle reflects 
the “long tradition in medical care that the determination of the inefficacy of 
treatment lies in the hands of the physician [but] the determination of the 
undesirability of treatment lies with the patient,” 193  and also guides the 
concept of informed consent, where a physician may not treat a patient 
without the informed consent of the patient or her health care proxy, except 
 
 190 See Taylor, supra note 181, at 87 (“Also deeply troubling is that the large majority of [pregnancy] 
restrictions legally compel the woman’s continued medical treatment regardless of such critical factors 
as her own pain and suffering, the fetus’s age, or its prognosis for either a live birth or a healthy life after 
birth.”). 
 191 TOM L. BEAUCHAMP & JAMES F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL ETHICS 1–12 (5th ed. 
2001); Theresa L. Chin et al., Exploring Ethical Conflicts in Emergency Trauma Research: The COMBAT 
(Control of Major Bleeding After Trauma) Study Experience, 157 SURGERY 10, 11 (2015); Nora Jacobson 
& Diego S. Silva, Dignity Promotion and Beneficence, 7 J. BIOETHICAL INQUIRY 365, 366 (2010); 
Christopher T Le M Rustom et al., Ethical Issues in Resuscitation and Intensive Care Medicine, 
11 ANAESTHESIA & INTENSIVE CARE MED. 1, 1–2 (2010). 
 192 Le M Rustom et al., supra note 191, at 1–2 (arguing the focus should be on maximal autonomy in 
resuscitation ethical dilemmas because full autonomy is an idealistic notion). 
 193 California’s Natural Death Act—Medical Staff Conference, supra note 47, at 323 (emphasis 
added). 
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in very limited situations.194 To balance beneficence and non-maleficence, 
physicians should best determine the patient’s interests, further the patient’s 
interests, and avoid harm to the patient. 195  Both beneficence and non-
maleficence focus on what is in the patient’s best interests.196 Beneficence 
considers what courses of action would further the patient’s interests, while 
non-maleficence considers what courses of action should not be taken 
because they are in conflict with the patient’s interests—typically 
embodying the general medical principles of “do not kill” and “do not cause 
needless pain.”197 Last, to balance justice, physicians are required to refrain 
from making “clinical decisions based on arbitrary social value judgments 
(age, race, sex, social status) as this would be unfair.”198 
Based on these basic bioethical principles, when a pregnant patient is 
incompetent, a physician should honor the prior expressed preferences of the 
patient in order to respect the patient’s autonomy, by first consulting her 
living will. Physicians should do so not only because respecting a pregnant 
patient’s directives best respects her autonomy, but also because physicians 
are ethically obligated to take actions that further the patient’s interests, do 
no harm, and do not reflect an arbitrary social value judgment based on the 
fact that the patient is a pregnant woman. In the absence of a living will, a 
physician should consult the patient’s health care proxy, who knows the 
patient’s preferences and values and can exercise substitute decision-making 
on behalf of the patient. In the absence of clear directives from the patient or 
her proxy, physicians and health care proxies must make a judgment together 
based on the patient’s past feelings, beliefs, and values.199 
In these scenarios, physicians and proxies should not be prohibited from 
considering all potential ethical issues and medical risks in making a decision 
about whether to void a pregnant woman’s advance health care directives. 
Currently, physicians cannot consider any ethical factors under the 
pregnancy exclusion statutes of most states,200 or are limited in which ethical 
factors may be considered in states that do allow physicians to weigh some 
ethical considerations.201 For example, many states have laws that only allow 
 
 194 See generally STUART M. SPEISER ET AL., The Doctrine of Informed Consent, 4A AM. L. TORTS 
§ 15:71, Westlaw (database updated March 2019). 
 195 See Le M Rustom et al., supra note 191, at 2. 
 196 See id. 
 197 Id. (noting that “[b]eneficence is a positive requirement of action,” “relevant when the patient is 
unable to act autonomously and when considering the potential futility of treatment”; whereas “[n]on-
maleficence  . . . requires refraining from actions that may cause harm”). 
 198 Id. 
 199 Id. 
 200 See supra Sections I.A–I.B. 
 201 See supra Section I.C. 
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consideration of the likelihood the fetus will develop to live birth, or 
consideration of whether continued treatment would cause pain or physical 
harm to the patient.202 Instead, physicians and health care agents should be 
empowered to weigh any relevant ethical considerations and medical risks 
that could impact the woman or the fetus if the pregnant woman’s life is 
prolonged on life support. 
At least one scholar has argued that pregnancy exclusion laws can be 
ethically permissible when the woman is brain-dead because the 
psychological harms of compelling a woman to carry a fetus to term are 
absent when a woman is in that state—claiming that the lack of intimacy that 
can make forced pregnancy traumatic is absent in these rare scenarios.203 
This argument rests on the premise that there is a unique relationship 
between a mother and her fetus, but once the mother is incapacitated, she 
will “never sense the burdens of gestation and will never have to rear the 
child in progress.”204 However, there are numerous reasons why a pregnant 
patient in a persistent vegetative state may not want to continue life-
sustaining treatment for the purposes of gestating a fetus, such as “cultural 
or religious reasons,” “the pain and psychological stress of intrusive and 
long-lasting medical treatment,” or even “the financial burden that excess 
health care will put on their families after they die.” 205  The bioethical 
principles described above suggest that the incapacity of a patient does not 
render the decision to continue life-sustaining treatment to the physician—
the decision rests with the patient through her expressed advance directives, 
or with the patient’s proxy in the absence of advance directives, based on the 
patient’s wishes and values. 
Furthermore, a concern that appears to underlie many existing state 
pregnancy exclusion laws is the idea that a pregnant woman who had 
previously drafted a living will or advance health care directives before she 
 
 202 See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 311.629 (2018); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 137-J:10 (2018); N.D. 
CENT. CODE ANN. § 23-06.5-09(5) (2017); 20 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5429 (2018); S.D. 
CODIFIED LAWS § 34-12D-10 (2018). 
 203 See, e.g., Manninen, supra note 181, at 403 (arguing that pregnancy is a unique experience 
between a woman and fetus that can render forced pregnancy traumatic for someone who wants an 
abortion; yet, brain-dead women receiving life-sustaining treatment are removed from these 
psychological harms). 
 204 CANTOR, supra note 183, at 225. Cantor also contends that a “pregnant woman’s postmortem 
interests in parenthood (or its avoidance) are not the same as her premortem interests.” Id. 
 205 Villarreal, supra note 23, at 1057–58. “[J]ust the act of keeping a woman on life support can be 
dangerous for the fetus” because “ventilators and catheters are ‘major sources of infection’ that can harm 
a fetus’s development.” Id. at 1060 (quoting Abuhasna Said et al., A Brain-Dead Pregnant Woman with 
Prolonged Somatic Support and Successful Neonatal Outcome: A Grand Rounds Case with a Detailed 
Review of Literature and Ethical Considerations, 3 INT’L J. CRITICAL ILLNESS & INJ. SCI. 220, 223 
(2013)). 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
1008 
was pregnant would change her mind if she knew she were pregnant now.206 
But the law cannot and should not account for every contingency or fear that 
women would amend their advance health care directives if they knew they 
were pregnant. Although it is reasonable to assume in some circumstances 
that a pregnant woman would make a different decision, having a law that 
outright voids a woman’s previously expressed end-of-life instructions as a 
hard-and-fast rule, without any other considerations, is not a viable 
solution.207 Lawmakers have no knowledge of these patients’ hearts and 
minds, and physicians’ best resource to know the patients’ wishes comes 
from the health care proxy. Therefore, the decision should ultimately remain 
with the proxy, and it is inappropriate to require physicians to void a pregnant 
woman’s advance directives under the misguided assumption that the 
woman would necessarily change her mind. 
IV. REFORMING STATE PREGNANCY EXCLUSION STATUTES 
TO BE CONSTITUTIONAL AND ETHICAL 
Because all state pregnancy exclusion statutes are both unconstitutional 
and unethical,208 this Note concludes that state legislatures must reform their 
laws to create a pregnancy exclusion statute that both is constitutional and 
conforms to today’s bioethical principles. Of course, one can question the 
value of pregnancy exclusions at all. One scholar has argued that the best 
option for states is to eliminate pregnancy exclusion laws and instead require 
physicians to have conversations with their pregnant patients about what 
their end-of-life wishes would be if they were to become incompetent during 
the pregnancy.209 The glaring lack of notice to both physicians and women 
of the existence and effect of pregnancy exclusion laws is certainly a problem 
that should be addressed by legislatures.210 For example, on the federal level, 
Congress should implement the CWPS study recommendation to amend the 
Patient Self-Determination Act to require physicians to inform all women 
 
 206 See Villarreal, supra note 23, at 1053 (“One possible justification for excluding pregnant women 
from using living wills . . . may be that the state believes women are unlikely to think about how their 
preferences might change during pregnancy.”). 
 207 See id. at 1059 (“The fact that they are pregnant, however, would not necessarily convince women 
who would be inclined to reject aggressive end-of-life medical care to accept it, and a pregnancy may 
make some women less likely to accept such care.”). 
 208 Though Colorado’s Category Five pregnancy exclusion law may appear at first glance to pass 
constitutional muster, this Note concludes it is likely unconstitutional. See supra Section II.A.5. 
 209 Villareal, supra note 23, at 1075 (arguing that this option preserves patient autonomy by providing 
choices and allowing women to contemplate their end-of-life wishes should they become incompetent). 
 210 See id. at 1053, 1076. 
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about the effect of state pregnancy laws on their advance directives; 211 
however, physicians themselves may not even be aware of their existence.212 
Nonetheless, there is value in having pregnancy exclusion laws that are 
both constitutional and ethical to provide physicians, patients, and courts 
with a clear procedure that respects patient autonomy and dignity within our 
constitutional frameworks. Some states that currently do not have pregnancy 
exclusion laws have “conscience clauses” in their advance directives 
legislation, which allow physicians to legally decline to follow a patient’s 
advance directives based on “reasons of conscience.”213 Thus, in these rare 
and ethically complicated situations, the law must provide protections for 
patient autonomy with a clear procedure physicians must follow to decide 
the best course of action for a pregnant patient.214 This would allow all 
parties to avoid litigating these decisions in courts, which could result in 
prolonged unwanted medical treatment.215 Having clear legal procedures to 
follow is especially important to ensure physicians’ personal biases do not 
influence their judgments about the best course of action and to protect them 
from civil or criminal liability if they choose to withdraw lifesaving 
treatment.216 
Though in the ideal scenario women will clarify in their advance health 
care directives what their end-of-life wishes would be in the case of 
 
 211 GREENE & WOLFE, supra note 54, at 6, 7 (“One of the biggest problems with pregnancy exclusions 
is that there is virtually no public awareness that they even exist, in part because there is no uniformity in 
the way in which pregnancy exclusion clauses are written into state statutes and they often appear under 
ambiguous or unrelated titles.”). 
 212 See Letter from Katherine S. Kohari, supra note 54. 
 213 See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. § 327E-7(e) (1999) (“A health-care provider may decline to comply 
with an individual instruction or health-care decision for reasons of conscience.”); MISS. CODE ANN. 
§ 41-41-215(5) (1999) (“A health-care provider may decline to comply with an individual instruction or 
health-care decision for reasons of conscience.”); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-321(k)(1) (2007) (“An attending 
physician may decline to honor a declaration that expresses a desire of the declarant that life-prolonging 
measures not be used if doing so would violate that physician’s conscience . . . .”). 
 214 See GREENE & WOLFE, supra note 54, at 4 (explaining that courts must determine how to proceed 
in states with no pregnancy exclusion laws, which may result in a pregnant woman being “forced to 
endure prolonged treatment—for weeks or even months—before the provisions of her advance directive 
can be carried out”); Schwager, supra note 30, at 606 (arguing that states’ living will statutes that are 
silent on pregnancy create ambiguity that “breeds reliance on the courts which results in delays” because 
a woman in a vegetative state “may be forced to endure prolonged life sustaining treatment against her 
wishes, while the Court decides whether or not her advanced directive may be carried out”). 
 215 See id. 
 216 See Schwager, supra note 30, at 598 (“[A]dvance directives ideally prevent the need for family 
members or health care providers to go to court or have to otherwise resolve treatment disputes that may 
arise . . . and allow[] medical staff to act accordingly without fear of repercussion.”); Villarreal supra 
note 23, at 1058 (“Both families and medical providers want to avoid going to court to litigate end-of-life 
care decisions, and doctors want to ensure that they will be protected from civil or criminal liability if 
they forgo certain medical procedures.”). 
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pregnancy, the law must properly address situations in which they have not 
done so. There are three situations that must be addressed separately with 
regard to reforming pregnancy exclusion laws: (1) where a woman has 
advance directives that clearly communicate her wishes in the case of 
pregnancy; (2) where a woman has advance directives that direct removal of 
life-sustaining treatment but do not clarify her wishes in the case of 
pregnancy; and (3) where a woman does not have any advance directives at 
all indicating her wishes on whether to sustain or remove life support.217 
A. Advance Directives Communicating Wishes in the Case of Pregnancy 
If a woman clearly communicates that her end-of-life wishes in the case 
of pregnancy are to remove life support, then state law should honor those 
wishes if the fetus is not viable.218 This means physicians should follow 
directives to remove life-sustaining treatment—allowing the patient to die a 
natural death and the fetus to die as a byproduct of the medical decision.219 
Respecting this decision pre-viability would be consistent with the right to 
terminate a pregnancy without an undue burden under Casey, and even after 
viability would be consistent with the right to refuse lifesaving medical 
treatment under Cruzan. Accordingly, the states that currently have laws that 
force a physician to void a pregnant woman’s advance directives220—even 
when the woman states her wishes in the case of pregnancy—should take 
immediate action to reform their statutes in line with the above constitutional 
rights. 
If a pregnant woman’s fetus is viable, a decision must be made about 
whether to induce birth since the fetus can survive outside the mother’s 
womb, or whether to continue life support to let the fetus further develop. In 
that scenario, the physician should inform the woman’s health care agent of 
all the relevant bioethical considerations and medical risks of prolonged 
treatment. These considerations would then guide the proxy in deciding 
 
 217 See Manninen, supra note 181, at 407 (explaining that these three scenarios pose different ethical 
dilemmas). 
 218 See id. at 409 (“If a pregnant woman has exercised her prospective autonomy to explicitly state 
that she does not want her body artificially sustained if she were to become brain-dead, even in the event 
of pregnancy, then her wishes should be respected to the same extent that her bodily autonomy takes 
precedence over the fetal interest in continued existence while she is living.”). 
 219 See id. 
 220 The states that do not respect advance directives that clarify one’s wishes in the case of pregnancy 
include Alabama, Idaho, Indiana, Kansas, Michigan, Missouri, South Carolina, Texas, Utah, and 
Wisconsin. ALA. CODE § 22-8A-4(e) (2018); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 39-4510 (2019); IND. CODE § 16-36-
4-8(d) (West 2017); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-28, 103(a)(4)(B) (2016); MICH. COMP. LAWS. § 700.5512(1) 
(2018); MO. ANN. STAT. § 459.025 (2018); S.C. CODE. ANN. § 62-5-507 (2018); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY 
CODE ANN. § 166.049 (West 2019); UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-2a-123(1) (2018); WIS. STAT. § 154.03(2) 
(2018). 
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whether the woman would want the physician to induce birth through a 
cesarean section, whether to keep the mother on life support to allow the 
fetus to further develop so it can be born with less risk,221 or whether the 
health risks are so high as to justify removing treatment despite the 
consequences for the fetus. Thus, in the case of a viable pregnancy, the 
woman’s right to refuse life-sustaining treatment under Cruzan would be 
delegated to her health care proxy who would be able to make an informed 
decision on her behalf about inducing birth or refusing further treatment. 
B. Advance Directives Without Clarifying in the Case of Pregnancy 
If a pregnant woman in a persistent vegetative state does not clarify in 
her advance directives what her end-of-life wishes would be in the case of 
pregnancy, but does state that her wish is to remove life-sustaining treatment, 
state law should not immediately void the advance directives. Instead, the 
law should impose a presumption that the woman would want to refuse 
medical treatment even with her current pregnancy. This presumption to 
refuse medical treatment, despite the woman’s pregnancy, could then be 
overcome by presenting evidence that the woman would have changed her 
mind if she knew she would be pregnant at the time that a decision regarding 
suspension of life support must be made. Though the details of such a 
proposal should be worked out by state legislatures working with physicians 
to determine exactly what this would entail, such evidence could include 
OBGYN visits, any previous conversations regarding pregnancy or child-
bearing, and other similar considerations that would help shed light on the 
woman’s likely intent.222 By imposing a presumption instead of immediately 
delegating the decision to the woman’s health care agent or family members, 
the law is more likely to honor the woman’s dignity and desires. 
C. No Advance Directives 
Finally, if a pregnant woman in a persistent vegetative state does not 
have advance health care directives expressing whether she would want to 
be sustained on life support, the decision should be delegated to the patient’s 
 
 221 See Manninen, supra note 181, at 409 (“The [viable] fetus, therefore should be sustained for the 
handful of weeks it would take to bring it to sufficient maturity so that it can be born with minimal 
[e]ffects to its health.”). 
 222 See id. at 410 (“For example, if a pregnant cadaver belonged to a woman who knew about her 
pregnancy and embraced it, and who had in the past expressed a moral or religious objection to 
terminating fetal life, one could reasonably conclude that she would have conceded to the continual 
gestation of the fetus, even in absence of any clear directive, because this seems consistent with her 
preferences and values.”). 
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health care agent.223 The health care proxy is the best party to make the 
decision because they are likely most familiar with the pregnant woman’s 
wishes and desires, whereas a physician probably lacks such insight.224 To 
guide the woman’s health care agent in making an informed decision about 
whether to remove or sustain lifesaving treatment, the woman’s physicians 
should inform those parties of bioethical considerations and medical risks. 
CONCLUSION 
Although cases of pregnant women in persistent vegetative states are 
exceedingly rare, when possible the law should seek to preserve the woman’s 
wishes and respect her autonomy in deciding whether to continue life-
sustaining treatment to develop the fetus. Because all current state pregnancy 
exclusion laws either violate constitutional rights or fall short of today’s 
bioethical norms, it is imperative for states to reform their respective statutes 
to be both constitutional and ethical. A presumption model is the most 
appropriate framework for a state statute because it passes constitutional 
muster and respects the pregnant woman’s autonomy—in situations where 
she would have continued life support and in situations where she would not. 
Given the glaring lack of notice about the existence of pregnancy exclusion 
laws, it is critical that women learn how the current pregnancy exclusion law 
in their state could have horrifying consequences for themselves, and 
ultimately call on lawmakers to adopt a constitutional and ethical solution. 
  
 
 223 This situation is particularly important to consider because many pregnant women are fairly young 
and may not have contemplated executing a living will. See Villarreal, supra note 23, at 1063. 
 224 This may not be true in all situations, such as where the patient is estranged from her family or 
even in an abusive relationship with her health care proxy. However, family and friends who are likely 
to be health care proxies are generally better positioned than a health care provider to exercise substitute 
decision-making in deciding what the woman would have wanted. Timothy J. Burch, Incubator or 
Individual?: The Legal and Policy Deficiencies of Pregnancy Clauses in Living Will and Advance Health 
Care Directive Statutes, 54 MD. L. REV. 528, 569–70 (1995). 
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 a That is, physical harm to the woman or severe pain that cannot be alleviated by medication. 
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